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Foreword 
This is a fascinating and well-implemented study of power and participation at the local level 
in Tanzania, making use of the power cube as an analytical framework. From a 
methodological perspective, the study shows that the power cube can provide a range of 
useful angles (power, spaces and levels) from which to view and illuminate the same 
dynamics, and with which to identify the connections between these dimensions.  
 
The study also reaches beyond the power cube framework in useful ways, drawing on 
concepts of resistance, power as pervasive and embedded in discourses, the analysis of 
actors and different forms of citizen action (e.g. individual and collective), and the role of 
economic action and empowerment as an enabler of citizen participation.  
 
The detailed account of the methodology used and questions posed in interviews and focus 
groups, together with applications of the power cube concepts and the other concepts and 
dimensions of power analysis noted above, provide a useful set of tools and guidelines that 
could be adapted for other studies.  
 
The report also points to ways in which the power cube analysis can be enhanced with other 
lenses, and to the need to synthesis and analyse findings across the dimensions of the cube 
as well as within them. As noted in many of the observations below, there are many lessons 
about the forms of power to be found under the findings on spaces and levels; lessons about 
spaces in the sections on power and levels; etc.  
 
This leads me to wonder whether the cube’s dimensions serve well as a reporting format, or 
whether there is a need for more cross-cutting analysis, such as that presented in the 
conclusion; and more use of related concepts and dimensions to illuminate the dynamics 
(e.g. resistance, discourse, actor and network analysis, and concepts of agency such as 
‘power to’, ‘power with’ and ‘power within’). At the very least, this challenge of reporting 
signals the need to address the role of the other dimensions of the cube within each heading, 
and other dimensions of analysis. 
 
Congratulations to the researchers for an excellent and insightful study, which I hope will 
inspire others to take up and adapt this approach in other contexts. I would be very 
interested to hear the reflections of the researchers on the use of the power cube framework, 
and where they found it helpful, limiting, or in need of adjustment to the issues and context of 
local power and participation in Tanzania. 
 
By Prof. Jethro Pettit, IDS 
10 Feb 2011 
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Executive Summary 
Introduction 
 
The objective of the present Study was to help uncover the “character of power” in villages 
and mitaa [streets] in Tanzania, specifically as related to decision-making about local 
development.  It examined how power is exercised at the local level, and by whom.  In 
addition, it sought to identify which opportunities are available for people living in poverty to 
influence decision making, and which obstacles block real participation as well as demands 
for accountability. 
 
The Study was carried out in a random sample of 15 villages, mitaa and “vitongoji” (hamlets) 
across Tanzania, using the “power cube” model of power.  This model is a framework for 
analyzing the levels, spaces and forms of power, as well as the interrelationship between 
these three dimensions. Respondents included village leaders and local business people 
(two traditionally influential groups), as well as women, youth, small farmers and casual 
laborers (representing traditionally less influential groups).  
Spaces of Participation 
 
Village meetings are the most common type of forum where citizens meet with local officials.  
However, ordinary respondents (i.e. those who are not leaders) appear to be skeptical about 
the participatory nature of these meetings.  Most decisions about local development tend to 
be made by councilors and Ward Executive Officers (WEOs), Village Executive Officers 
(VEOs) and Village Chairpersons.  
 
In all villages and mitaa surveyed, there is a large gap between leaders and other 
respondents when it comes to interpretations of successful “participation”.  Leaders conceive 
of successful participation as getting people to attend meetings (and, implicitly, getting them 
to accept the decisions they have made).  Other respondents, on the whole, question their 
ability to genuinely influence local plans. 
 
Most respondents tend to participate primarily in non-interactive ways. The way in which 
decisions are made about local development has not changed over the past five years, 
though there seems to be more awareness among local populations of development 
projects. 
Forms of Power 
 
Official forums, and in particular village meetings (as the primary locus of visible power), are 
generally perceived by ordinary respondents as the channel through which leaders inform 
them of the decisions they (i.e. leaders) have taken; they do not consider them so much as 
forums where they can actually influence decisions.  
 
Ordinary villagers claim to have relatively few alternative, informal or “hidden” forms of power 
of their own to counter the visible and hidden instruments of power of local leaders and 
officials.  The most important—and common—acknowledged hidden power forms wielded by 
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ordinary villagers is petty corruption, which seems to grease the wheels of many local 
transactions.   
 
Most respondents do not demand to participate as they do not see opportunities to get 
involved, and as they expect their leaders to take the initiative. Another reason people do not 
demand to participate is out of fear for the repercussions of “demanding too much”.   
 
There appears to be little evidence of “false consciousness” among non-leader respondents, 
i.e. most ordinary villagers do not believe local leaders have a natural right to their positions.  
Therefore, the ability of leaders’ to “shock and awe” villagers with invisible power would seem 
to be limited.  However, most respondents do feel that leaders are “advantaged” relative to 
themselves because in their positions they can capture small bribes and have access to 
other small benefits.  Economic hardships are the main reason why ordinary villagers feel 
disadvantaged, in general, and when compared to their leaders. 
Levels of Decision Making 
 
Most respondents (both leaders and non-leaders) feel that development in their villages is 
most strongly influenced by leaders at the local (village and district) level.  The influence of 
the local level on people’s lives seems to have increased during the past five years.  
 
There is evidence to suggest that many villagers are taking matters into their own hands, 
rather than (solely) organizing through collective action, when they really need to obtain 
services or resources.  This form of “self-development” adds another layer to the concept of 
the “local level” in the third dimension of the power cube, as (informal) self-development 
needs to be distinguished from the “formal” local level, as represented by local leaders and 
officialdom.  Self-development might also be construed as a form of “hidden power” 
possessed by ordinary villagers, even though it arises from these villagers’ frustrations with 
their lack of access to alternative mechanisms to wield influence and participate in local 
decision-making. 
Conclusion 
 
The results of the Study confirm some of the familiar conclusions about participation in the 
existing literature on development and participation in Tanzania. Other findings are newer 
and perhaps more surprising.  Among the familiar findings is the fact that, first, there is a long 
tradition of centralized planning in Tanzania; this tradition is still reflected—to varying 
degrees—in the current practice of local development planning, which is still quite “top down” 
in orientation. Second, the current practice of participation at local level is of a different kind 
than the one promoted by many development organizations. It emphasizes citizens’ 
obligation to contribute to their country’s development but not in actual decision-making. And 
third, participation—when it does occur in local development—is often accompanied by 
patronage and lack of transparency. 
 
The Study exposed six “new” findings.  First, no significant relationship could be found 
between council performance (as determined by overall council performance and per capita 
budget allocations for health and primary education) and the level and quality of public 
participation in the villages and mitaa surveyed. Second, there is a large gap in perceptions 
of participation between leaders and ordinary respondents: leaders are much more 
convinced than their constituents that village meetings are open, decision-making forums 
where ordinary villagers can have their say. Other respondents are much more skeptical.  
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Third, for many respondents economic activities, such as self-help groups centered around 
income generation activities, are often a stepping stone for social and political empowerment. 
Fourth, most villagers acknowledge that they need to engage in bribery or “gift giving” to local 
leaders and officials in order to get almost anything done, from demanding small favors to 
circumventing the local bureaucracy and “solving problems”.  Fifth, the Study uncovered both 
formal and informal accountability structures at village level.  The success of both types of 
mechanisms to ensure accountability depends on local leadership and the degree to which 
citizens, civil society and opposition party members are willing to put pressure on local 
leaders.  Finally, despite the many difficulties associated with genuine participation, there are 
examples of “success stories” in several of the villages included in the Study, where the most 
historically vulnerable villagers (women, youth and small farmers) are feeling more 
empowered, mainly as a result of good individual leadership and collective organization 
(whether in formal or “informal” structures).  
Recommendations 
 
The Study includes three sets of recommendations.  First, it cites respondents’ own priorities 
for promoting greater participation in their villages and mitaa, which include the need to 
achieve greater transparency in decision-making regarding local development and the need 
for citizens to achieve better access to information.  Second, the Study Team’s own 
proposals to improve transparency and strengthen participation include recommendations on 
increasing citizen access to local budget information; reducing opportunities for corruption 
and patronage based politics; reducing the scope for partisan politics; helping women to 
break down the cultural barriers to greater participation; and increasing options for 
participation in local forums through anonymous channels. And third, the Study Team 
proposes modifications and additions to the power cube model of analyzing power, in order 
to improve the effectiveness of this model as a framework for the study of power relations at 
local level in Tanzania.  
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1 Introduction 
This document represents the final report of the “Study of Participation at Local Level in 
Tanzania”, as commissioned jointly by PMO-RALG and the Swedish Embassy in Tanzania, 
and as carried out by a team contracted by the Institute for Housing and Urban Development 
Studies (IHS).   
 
The study aims to contribute to the development of the Local Government Reform Program 
in Tanzania, which is led by PMO-RALG, in two ways:  
 
1. By analyzing the ability of people living in poverty in Tanzania to participate in 
decision-making processes, influence decisions and demand accountability at the 
local level; 
 
2. By helping to uncover the character of power relations at local level, through the 
application of the “power cube” model of power, and in so doing, identifying 
opportunities available to people living in poverty to influence decision making, and 
identifying those obstacles that block real participation. 
1.1 Understanding the “Character” of Local Power Relations 
 
The purpose of the assignment was to create a better understanding of how power is 
exercised at the local level and which opportunities are available for people living in poverty 
to influence decision making, and which obstacles block real participation as well as 
demands for accountability from decision-making. The analysis is linked to the objectives and 
implementation of the Local Government Reform Program, which evidence suggests has 
contributed to increased participation at a quantitative but perhaps not qualitative level. 
 
The underlying assumption of the Study is that power relations at local level in Tanzania (as 
well as possibly at national level and at supra-national level) have a profound effect on the 
ability of the poor to engage in successful participation and make their voices heard. For this 
reason, a thorough understanding of the power dynamics affecting the target group is 
necessary to underpin further development and policy reform.   
 
The Study provides a deeper understanding of the social, economic and political power 
structures and power relations in Tanzania, through the application of the “power cube” 
model of power to the study of participation in a sample of 12 villages and 3 mitaa nationwide 
in Tanzania, using participatory methods of research. The “power cube” is a framework for 
analyzing the levels, spaces and forms of power, and their interrelationship. It provides a 
useful approach to explore various aspects of power and how they interact with each other 
by focusing on actors, relationships, forces, arena and possibilities for change. 
1.2 Outline of the Report 
 
The Report is divided into the following main sections: 
 
• Section 2 describes the methodology of the Study, including the survey instruments, 
target respondents, assumptions, circumstances and limitations.  
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• Section 3 provides an overview of the sampling and random selection criteria applied 
to obtain the councils and villages and mitaa included in the Study.  
 
• Section 4 describes the “power cube” approach to power, which is the theoretical 
framework for the Study, and identifies how the power cube dimensions have been 
conceptualized through the survey instruments.  
 
• Sections 5, 6 and 7 summarize the findings of the Study using the conceptualizations 
of power described in section 4.  Results of individual interviews are described first to 
present an overview of findings about the character of power at local level.  These 
findings are then triangulated with the results of the focus group discussions (FGDs) 
and large group discussions (LGDs).   
 
• The conclusion of the report (section 8) identifies the main results of the Study that 
are echoed in the development literature on participation in Tanzania.  In addition, it 
presents results that can be characterized as “new” findings, i.e. outcomes that are 
less widely known and (thus far) not adequately covered in the literature.   
 
• Section 9 provides the main recommendations of the report. These include 
respondents’ own recommendations for improving participation and accountability in 
their villages and mitaa, as well as the Study Team’s own recommendations on the 
same themes. Finally, the report assesses the merits and effectiveness of the power 
cube as a framework for an analysis of power relations. 
 
• Appendices 1 through 4 contain the questionnaires and survey instruments used to 
guide the individual interviews, focus group discussions and large group discussions 
in Phases 1 and 2 of the Study (overview phase and in-depth phase). Appendix 5 
provides an illustration of local-level decision making structures.  
2 Methodological Approach 
2.1 Study Phases and Total Respondents 
 
The Study was carried out in two phases: an overview phase (Phase 1) took place from 4 
October to 19 November 2010, and an in-depth phase (Phase 2) was undertaken from 22 to 
26 November 2010.   
 
• Phase 1 aimed to collect information on a wide range of topics related to power and 
participation at local level, according to each of the power cube dimensions. This 
phase was undertaken in all 15 survey areas covered by the Study and targeted a 
total of 720 respondents1.  
 
• Phase 2 was designed to address some of the perceived gaps remaining from data 
collected in Phase 1. Four sub-topics were addressed: collective attempts to make 
demands and influence decision-making; individual strategies (“self-development”); 
policy recommendations related to villagers’ capacity (or lack thereof) to organize; 
and policy recommendations related to participation in official structures. Phase 2 was 
                                               
1
 See Table 1, section 2.3, for more detail on target number of respondents.  
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undertaken in 3 selected survey areas covered by the Study, which were selected at 
random. During this phase, the research teams approached 180 of the same 
respondents already targeted in Phase 1 in an effort to seek more detailed follow-on 
information related to each of the four sub-topics. 
2.2 Study Approach 
 
The methodology of the Study was characterized by two main aspects.  First, the research 
was qualitative in nature. Qualitative tools (individual interviews, focus group discussions, 
and large group discussions) were used to collect data, and data were primarily qualitative in 
nature.  And second, the research was based on in-depth “portraits” of 15 case study 
villages/mitaa throughout Tanzania.  
 
Each team of researchers stayed in a data collecting area for a period of no less than six 
days. This was geared not only towards collecting the necessary qualitative data but also 
towards gaining a better understanding of local dynamics and the way in which people in 
each area lived, and in so doing gaining a more nuanced understanding of the data 
collected.  
 
For the analysis of findings in the present final report (sections 5, 6 and 7), data from 
individual interviews were compiled in SPSS and complemented with qualitative data from 
the focus group discussions and large group discussions.  Thus, patterns were first identified 
in the results from individual interviews and subsequently examined further with the 
qualitative data from the FGDs and LGDs.  To illustrate major points in the analysis, the 
report uses—as much as much as possible—respondents’ own words. Citations have been 
edited only in those cases where grammatical corrections were necessary to facilitate 
comprehension; content of citations has not been modified.   
2.3 Survey Instruments 
 
The Research Team utilized three types of survey instruments to gather data in each village 
or mtaa in Phases 1 and 2: individual interviews, focus group discussions, and large group 
discussions (see Appendices for the survey questionnaires).  
 
Table 1 shows the total number of respondents per village or mtaa in both phases of the 
Study, along with the target number of respondents for each instrument2.    
 
 
                                               
2
 Notes regarding total number of respondents: 1) The total is an estimate based on the target number 
of respondents for FGDs and LGDs; the actual figure might be slightly higher or lower than this total, 
depending on attendance of FGDs and LGDs; 2) Phase 2 respondents were the same individuals 
approached in Phase 1, therefore the Phase 2 total does not represent additional respondents.  
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Survey instrument Target no. of respondents 
(per village/mtaa) 
Target no. of respondents (all 
villages/mitaa) 
Phase 1: 8  Phase 1: 120 Individual interviews 
Phase 2: 10  Phase 2: 30 
Phase 1: 40 (4 FGDs gathering 
10 respondents each) 
Phase 1: 600 Focus group discussion 
Phase 2: 50 (5 FGDs gathering 
10 respondents each)  
Phase 2: 150 
Phase 1: 48 (all respondents 
from the FGDs and interviews) 
Phase 1: 720 Large group discussion 
Phase 2: 58 (all respondents 
from the FGDs and interviews)  
Phase 2: 180 
Phase 1: 48 Phase 1: 720 Total 
Phase 2: 58 Phase 2: 180 
Table 1: Number of respondents per survey instrument 
2.3.1 Individual Interviews 
 
In each village or mtaa, the researchers started by spending one day interviewing 
respondents individually. The total number of individual interviews per village was 8 (two 
researchers conducting 4 interviews each). The individual interviews enabled the Research 
Team to obtain an overview of issues of decision-making, participation, and “power” in each 
study area.   
 
Each individual interview lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours, depending on the propensity of the 
respondents to talk. There were five target groups for the individual interviewees: local 
leaders, women, youth, small farmers (in rural areas) and casual laborers, in urban areas 
(see next section on target respondents for more detail). In Phase 2 an additional target 
group included local business people. Two respondents from each category were 
approached for the individual interviews.  In each village/mtaa, the two local leaders were the 
VEO and the Village Chairman.  The researchers located the other interviewees through 
“snowball sampling”3, by using the village population (and not the VEO) as reference 
persons.  The individual interviewees were people considered to be “key informants” in their 
communities, i.e. knowledgeable people who know their village or mtaa well, and who are not 
shy or afraid to talk.   
 
A total of 120 individuals were interviewed in Phase 1, and another 30 interviewees were 
covered in Phase 2.  Figure 1 identifies the total number of individual interviewees per 
respondent category in Phases 1 and 2.  Village leaders made up the single largest response 
category (at 25 percent).  Thirty percent of all interviewees were from “more influential” 
categories (village leaders and local business people).  The remainder were from “less 
influential” categories, comprising women, youth, casual laborers (in urban areas and 
hamlets or “vitongoji”), and small farmers (in the villages).   
 
                                               
3
 Snowball sampling is a technique for identifying respondents whereby researchers locate one person 
(known as the “reference person”) and then ask that person for the names of other (similar) people 
that he or she knows who possess the characteristics of the sub-group required.  
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Women comprised 50 percent of all respondents in each of the sub-categories, including 
leaders, business people, youth, small farmers and casual laborers, except for the sub-
category of “women” (where women comprised 100 percent of respondents).  
 
Figure 1: Number of individual interviewees per category, Phases 1 and 2  
(Figure shows N and %; N = 126: 120 respondents + 6 business people in Phase 2 only) 
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the total number of individual interviewees in rural areas 
(villages) and urban areas (mitaa and hamlets or “vitongoji”)4.  Seventy percent of 
interviewees were from rural areas and 30 percent from urban areas or hamlets.  
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of rural/urban status of individual interviewees, Phases 1 and 2 
(Figure shows N and %; N = 126: 120 respondents + 6 business people in Phase 2 only) 
 
2.3.2 Focus Group Discussions 
 
                                               
4
 The number of interviewees from “urban” areas includes respondents from the newly classified 
hamlet of Kichangare (Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
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The objective of the focus group discussions was to provide an opportunity to a select group 
of respondents with shared characteristics to discuss in depth their perceptions of decision-
making, participation, and their influence at local level. Each FGD lasted between 1.5 and 2 
hours, and brought together a small group of people (no more than 10 individuals in each 
group), in order to ensure that all respondents had a chance to speak.  The FGDs served to 
“triangulate” (verify) selected data obtained during the individual interviews; the purpose of 
this was to assess whether data results differed according to the format of questioning. The 
questionnaires for the FGDs contained a number of identical questions from the individual 
interviews—to enable triangulation—as well as additional, more detailed follow-up questions. 
 
The categories of respondents for the FGDs were the same as for the interviews (village 
leaders, women, youth, small farmers, casual laborers and business people), although the 
actual respondents were different individuals. The VEOs mobilized respondents for each 
discussion, according to the criteria communicated to them by the researchers. Two 
researchers assisted with each FGD: one researcher was the facilitator while the other was 
the note taker.  As best as possible, the FGDs were held in an enclosed space away from 
the general public, so as to prevent curious passers-by from listening to—and joining in—the 
discussion. This was to provide respondents with a feeling of privacy (at least within their 
own group) and to encourage them to express their opinions.  
 
A total of 600 respondents participated in FGDs in Phase 1 and another 150 respondents 
took part in FGDs during the in-depth phase (Phase 2) of the Study.  The Survey Team 
ensured that half of all participants of FGDs were women, except for the “women’s” FGDs 
(where all respondents were women).  
 
2.3.3 Large Group Discussions 
 
Large group discussions were held on the final (fourth) day of the Survey in each village or 
mtaa.  The researchers invited all respondents from the individual interviews and FGDs to 
gather in a public place; there, the researchers summarized the main findings of the 
interviews and the FGDs (without linking the identities of any individuals to opinions 
expressed) and sought their comment and clarification on the results.    
 
The LGDs served at least two purposes.  First, they had a ceremonial function: refreshments, 
were served (as an added incentive to ensure that most respondents attend the meeting), 
and researchers provided feedback to the village or mtaa, as a courtesy to the local 
population and leadership after spending four days in their midst5.  At the same time, the 
LGDs were an occasion for a farewell gesture before the researchers left the area.  The 
second purpose of the LGD was as another way to triangulate and verify the research 
findings from the individual interviews and FGDs, and to clarify any outstanding issues.  In 
practice, the “group dynamic” inherent in the LGDs helped to spur on discussion and produce 
unexpected results: a value-added of the LGDs was to bring together groups of people (from 
the five categories of respondents) who might otherwise have little occasion to meet together 
and discuss issues related to local development.  
 
The researchers used a shortened version of the list of questions for the FGDs as a basis for 
the large group discussions.  Only core questions and findings were raised, unless 
                                               
5
 The courtesy gesture was a response to a commonly heard complaint about survey exercises: local 
populations frequently mention that they resent the fact that survey teams rarely “report back” to them 
about the results of local data collection exercises.  
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respondents wanted to go over the results of some of the additional questions discussed.  
The researchers presented the findings of the core questions on flip chart paper, which they 
read out aloud to the assembled audience.   
 
All respondents (individual interviewees and participants from the FGDs) were invited to 
attend the LGD in each village/mtaa.  
2.4 Target Respondents  
 
In both Phases 1 and 2, the Study targeted five main categories of respondents: leaders, 
women, youths, small farmers and casual laborers. In Phase 2 the Study also targeted an 
additional group, i.e., local business people.  
 
The rationale for the selection of these groups was to achieve a balance of “advantaged” and 
“less advantaged” respondents.  Local leaders and business people are assumed to have a 
certain degree of influence and status in a community.  The four remaining categories 
(women, youth, small farmers and casual laborers) represent those groups traditionally 
assumed to have less status and influence, and are assumed to be socially and economically 
more vulnerable.   
 
The different categories of respondents were defined as follows: 
 
• In the context of the Study, the category of local leaders comprised the “local elites” 
of the villages surveyed, including local officials such as village chairpersons, ten cell 
leaders and/or vitongoji (sub-village) leaders, VEOs, mtaa chairpersons and 
councilors. While the VEO and village chairperson participated in the interviews and 
Large Group Discussions (LGDs), the other types of leaders participated in the FGD 
for leaders and the LGDs.  In addition to officials, the category of “local leaders” also 
included some local religious and civil society leaders.  
 
• The category of local business people includes those who enjoy esteem in the 
community as a result of their owning a prominent local business (of whatever kind) 
and earning more money than the average citizen.   
 
• Women respondents included ordinary village women from a mix of social classes, 
age groups, employment status, and religions, reflecting the diversity of female 
citizens present in each surveyed village or mtaa.  Women in this category could not 
be classified as “local leaders” or as “youth” (i.e. they were above the age of 25).   
 
• Youth comprised unmarried young men and women between the ages of 18 and 25. 
The lower age limit of 18 was established so as to include only young people who are 
eligible to officially participate in civic life, as indicated by the ability to vote (the 
minimum voting age in Tanzania is 18).  The unmarried status represents a 
concession to local social conventions: traditionally, young people are considered 
“youths” in Tanzanian culture if they are not yet married.  Conversely, they are 
considered as adults (and thus become socially more important and less 
marginalized) when they become married.  
 
• Small farmers were defined as smallholders, engaging in subsistence farming or 
small-scale market trading for their agricultural products. The emphasis on 
smallholders was to ensure that respondents included those considered poor and 
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traditionally without influence, as opposed to larger (wealthier and more influential) 
farmers.  
 
• Casual laborers comprise those workers doing odd jobs in the urban informal 
economy. As in the case of small famers, the emphasis on casual laborers is to 
ensure that respondents include those considered poor and traditionally without 
influence, as opposed to more established (wealthier and more influential) laborers in 
the informal or formal economies.  
2.5 Assumptions, Circumstances and Limitations 
 
The Study was guided and shaped by several assumptions and limitations, summarized 
below. These need to be considered when interpreting the findings described in this report.  
 
• Focus on the village/mtaa level: The principal focus of the Study was at the level of 
the village (in rural areas) and mtaa (in urban areas), as these represent the lowest 
units of government in Tanzania. The village/mtaa level is considered to be the layer 
of government closest to the people. The Study paid special attention to the workings 
of the village meeting, which is a consultation and information forum that is, in 
principle, the main officially sanctioned venue for citizen participation in decision-
making related to local development.  The text boxes below explain, in brief, the 
system of local governance in Tanzania as it applies to this Study, as well as the 
purpose of village meetings. 
 
Local Government in Tanzania 
Source: Commonwealth Local Government Forum, Tanzania Country Profile 
 
Local government in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar is divided into rural and urban authorities. On 
the mainland, urban authorities comprise city, municipal and town councils. In rural areas there are 
two levels of authority: district councils and village council and township authorities. In urban areas the 
mtaa is the smallest unit within the ward of an urban authority6. In rural areas, the smallest units of a 
village are known as vitongoji (also known as sub-villages or hamlets). In mainland Tanzania there are 
22 urban councils and 106 district councils, four cities, 10,364 registered villages, 1,795 mitaa, and 
51,000 vitongoji.  
District and urban councils coordinate the activities of village council and township authorities, which 
are accountable to the district for all revenues received for day-to-day administration. The village and 
township councils have responsibility for formulating plans for their areas, and in most cases securing 
district approval. Village councils have between 15 and 25 members, made up of a Chairperson 
elected by the village assembly, all chairpersons of the vitongoji within its area, and other members 
elected by the village assembly. The term of office for councilors is five years. The secretary to the 
village council is the village/mtaa executive officer (VEO). Women must comprise at least 25 percent 
of council members.  
Below the level of the local authorities there are a number of democratic bodies to debate local 
development needs. In the rural system the vitongoji are composed of elected chairpersons who 
appoint a secretary and three further members, all of whom serve on an advisory committee. In urban 
areas the recently established mtaa committees, unlike those of the vitongoji, have a fully elected 
membership comprising a chairperson, six members and an executive officer. These committees 
provide a grassroots link to the ward structure, and mobilize participation in local development. 
 
The Role of Village Meetings 
                                               
6
 The plural form of “mtaa” is “mitaa”.  
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Local authorities are now required to promote and ensure democratic participation. In principle, one of 
the main ways in which this occurs is through village meetings, which fulfill a critical role as 
consultation and information forums for citizens.  The process begins at the level of the vitongoji or 
sub-villages, where people present their needs and priorities.  At the village level the sub-village needs 
are presented in the village development committee and development projects are identified, to be 
presented at the village meeting. Village development proposals and priorities take the form of 
suggestions, which are then presented at the Ward Development Committee (WDC).   
District councils have the formal powers to decide which projects are funded by public funds in a 
village.  The assumption is that as the councilors—who are the major stakeholders at the council—are 
the representatives of the people, then it means that the “people” have participated. District councils 
have the capacity to look at the proposed development projects comprehensively, within the 
framework of available funds and the general policy and priorities of the state, available human 
resource capacities, their access to the donors, and development-oriented civil society organizations. 
Once funds are allocated to a village project, the sub-village and the village/mtaa chairpersons, in 
conjunction with the VEO, see to it that the funds allocated to the projects are dispersed according to 
plan. 
 
• Local development as a reference point: The activity of planning for local 
development projects at the level of the village and mtaa—both through formal 
channels as well as informal structures—was used as the focal point and reference 
for the study of decentralization and participation. It can be argued that the activity of 
planning for development at local level lies at the very heart of good governance for 
villagers anywhere. It is arguably also one of the most essential and universal outputs 
of civic participation.  The Study has sought to identify and analyze planning initiatives 
for development projects at the local level that encompass a range of both formal 
(officially sanctioned) as well as informal (villagers’ own initiative) activities aimed at 
making available concrete improvements in the lives of citizens, such as water supply 
projects, roads, and health interventions. These activities take place in both formal as 
well as informal committees and forums, in forums organized by official village 
structures as well as forums initiated by villagers themselves. Furthermore, as a result 
of the campaign for national elections in Tanzania (see next point), the process of 
planning for local development projects offered a more neutral activity to base 
questions around than the concept of political participation, which could have been 
another potential reference point for any study of participation and good governance. 
 
• National elections: The research period for the present study coincided with the 
political campaign for the 2010 Tanzanian national elections, which took place on 31 
October 2010. The campaign impacted on the research in several ways. Firstly, it 
resulted in a general politicization of discussions about development and 
participation, and thus limited the ability of the study to investigate the concept of 
political participation and empowerment in a neutral and effective manner. For this 
reason, as explained in the point above, it was decided to limit the focus of the 
research to the more neutral and technical sounding concept of development 
planning (both through formal and informal channels). Second, the electoral 
campaign limited the ability of the study to include and deal with political issues (such 
as the selection of regions dominated by the dominant or opposition political parties) 
as part of its sampling criteria. 
 
• Acknowledging limited representativeness: Tanzania has a total population of 
approximately 40 million and is comprised of more than 12,000 villages, over 3,000 
mitaa, and over 340 wards. The present study is limited in scope: it has been set up 
to target approximately 900 respondents in 12 villages and 3 mitaa nationwide. As a 
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result, the study does not seek to achieve “representativeness” at the national level 
for its findings. Rather, it aims to provide a broad qualitative assessment of the nature 
of power relations at local level in a range of different villages/mitaa nationwide. It is 
hoped that the results may be a basis for further exploration in larger surveys in the 
future. Within these limitations, however, the study aims to capture as much of the 
diverse conditions characterizing the populations of villages and mtaa in Tanzania as 
possible. 
 
• Snapshot of power relations: The findings described in this report represent only a 
snapshot in time of the character of power relations in the Tanzanian villages and 
mitaa covered by the Study.  No previous baseline study of local power dynamics 
could be used as a historical reference point, therefore, the Study cannot claim to 
accurately measure any changes over time in power and participation at local level.  
In addition, several of the items in the questionnaires (see Appendices) asked 
respondents to compare their current situation with that of five years ago7. The 
purpose of these comparative questions was to understand citizens’ perceptions of 
the direction of change in their villages and mitaa.  
 
• Over-sampling and under-sampling: The categories of respondents selected may 
not accurately represent the populations of villages and mitaa sampled.  Moreover, 
certain categories of respondents (particularly local leaders) have been oversampled 
relative to their proportion of the local population, in order to achieve a balance 
between presumed “advantaged” and “disadvantaged” groups.  Conversely, other 
respondent categories (i.e. casual laborers) have been under-sampled.  In the case of 
casual laborers, this category was only interviewed in mitaa (not in rural areas); as 
urban areas represented only one-fifth of the total sample, therefore casual laborers 
were necessarily a small respondent category.   
3 Overview of Councils Included in the Study 
The Study was conducted in 11 (rural) villages and 4 “urban” areas (either mitaa or hamlets) 
throughout Tanzania8.   
 
Sampling of villages followed the criterion of central government budget allocations to 
councils, which in Tanzania is based on the performance of councils in relation to several 
different aspects of service delivery and human resource capacity. One of the main premises 
behind the sampling approach was to examine whether there was a relationship between 
central government budget allocations to councils and the levels and quality of participation 
in villages and mitaa in these councils. The local government performance criterion was 
considered important for the selection of the villages because it was assumed that access to 
                                               
7
 Five years was determined to be a suitable period in which to assess the direction of change: long 
enough to be able to assess relevant changes, but not too long so that respondents can still accurately 
recollect events.  
8
 The Terms of Reference mandated that the Study was to be carried out in 12 (rural) villages and 3 
(urban) mitaa throughout Tanzania. But after the random selection of villages and mitaa had taken 
place, the Study Team discovered—on the ground—that one of the “villages” selected (Kichangare, in 
Mwanga district council, Kilimanjaro region) was officially no longer declared a village but a hamlet. All 
“villages” in Mwanga township authority are in the process of transferring from rural to urban status, 
though this information had not yet been updated at national level at the time of the survey exercise.  
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better services has an influence on participation: the better the access to services (and the 
better the quality of services), the higher the participation levels and, conversely, the lower 
the access to services, the weaker the participation.  
 
To test the relationship between council performance and participation, the councils included 
in this Study were selected so as to achieve a balanced sample between highly performing, 
medium-high and weakly performing councils. The relationship between council performance 
and participation is evaluated in the concluding section of this report (see section 8.2.1).  
 
Region Rural 
council 
Urban 
council Ward Village 
Mtaa or 
Hamlet Score
9
 
Mwanga   Mwanga  Kichangare High Kilimanjaro 
Moshi   East Old Moshi  Kidia   Medium 
Coastal Mkuranga   Mbezi Msorwa   Low 
Morogoro Mvomero  Mvomero  Wami Dakawa  Low 
Ukerewe   Kagera Kagera   Low Mwanza 
  Mwanza Buhongwa   Ng’washi Low 
Mara Rorya   Bukura Bubombi   n/a 
Singida Manyoni   Idodyadole Mbugani   Medium 
Tabora Igunga   Ziba Iborogero   Low 
Mbeya Kyela   Ikama Ilopa   High 
Iringa   Ifunda Mbitimikali   High Iringa 
  Njombe Mjimwema   Mjimwema  Medium 
Mtwara   Ziwani Ding'wida   Medium Mtwara 
  Mtwara-
Mikindani 
Jangwani  Mchangani High 
Tanga Pangani  Pangani 
Mashariki 
Pangani 
Mashariki 
 High 
Table 2: Overview of villages and mitaa in the Study sample for Phase 1 
 
Villages and mitaa in the Study sample for Phase 1 are listed in Table 2 (in the shaded 
columns), along with the names of their regions and councils. The villages and mitaa 
selected for the in-depth research period in Phase 2 are listed in Table 3.   
 
Region Rural 
council 
Urban 
council Ward Village 
Mtaa or 
Hamlet Score 
Kilimanjaro Mwanga   Mwanga  Kichangare High 
Mwanza Ukerewe   Kagera Kagera   Low 
Mbeya Kyela   Ikama Ilopa   High 
Table 3: Overview of villages and mitaa in the Study sample for Phase 2 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9
 “Score” refers to the average of three indicators in the LOGIN Tanzania database: overall council 
performance, and per capita budget allocations for health and primary education. See Table 4.   
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For Phase 1 of the Study, councils were selected on the basis of performance data as 
published in an annual assessment of local government authorities produced by PMO-
RALG10.  Subsequently, the sample was also cross-checked with the database of Local 
Government Information (LOGIN) Tanzania, to ensure that the list of selected councils 
reflected a range of different performances in three key service areas reported by LOGIN 
Tanzania, namely: per capita budgets for health and primary education, and overall local 
government performance.  Both data sources indicate that the Study sample of councils 
selected is diverse, i.e. that the sample comprises a balanced range of council performances 
in access to services, from weak to strong. For Phase 2 of the Study (the in-depth phase), 
three councils were chosen that represented a cross-section of councils in the sample, both 
in terms of rural/urban status as well as local government performance results across three 
indicators contained in the LOGIN Tanzania database (see Table 4).  The three areas were 
the hamlet of Kichangare (Mwanga council) and the villages of Kagera (Ukerewe council) 
and Ilopa (Kyela council).      
 
Table 4 illustrates the performance of councils included in the sample with regard to three 
selected indicators from LOGIN Tanzania pertaining to internal capacities and service 
delivery (overall performance, per capita budget allocation for health, and per capita budget 
allocation for primary education).   
 
Council name Total 
score11 
Overall 
performance12 
Budget for primary 
education (Tsh.) 
Budget for health 
(Tsh.) 
Pangani  12 81.3% 29,968 18,570 
Iringa  12 80.0% 21,019 8,283 
Mtwara-Mikindani 9 83.9% 14,579 6,702 
Mwanga  9 67.1% 25,000 13,203 
Kyela  9 48.4% 22,291 8,211 
Mtwara  7 81.9% 11,267 3,308 
Moshi  7 76.1% 22,266 3,601 
Njombe  6 86.5% 15,696 2,695 
Manyoni  6 70.3% 11,617 6,252 
Mvomero  5 54.8% 11,751 4,408 
Ukerewe  5 61.3% 13,951 4,416 
Mwanza  5 70.1% 14,394 5,985 
Igunga  4 69.7% 14,423 4,361 
                                               
10
 See United Republic of Tanzania (2009), Annual Assessment of LGAs for Minimum Conditions and 
Performance Measures under Local the Government Development Grant System for FY 2009/10 – 
United Republic of Tanzania, National Synthesis Report, PMO-RALG. 
11
 “Total score” reflects an average performance across all three indicators.  This is calculated by 
assigning 4 points to the councils in the top range, 2 points to the councils in the middle range, and 1 
point to the councils in the bottom range.  The points for each council were added up, resulting in 3 
categories of councils: above average councils (9 to 12 points), average councils (6 to 7 points), and 
below average councils (4 to 5 points).  
12
 “Overall performance”, as defined by LOGIN Tanzania, reflects the outcome of a performance 
assessment evaluating council performance based on nine categories: financial management; fiscal 
capacity; planning and budgeting; transparency and accountability; interaction between higher local 
governments and lower local governments; human resource development; procurement; project 
implementation, and council functional process. 
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Council name Total 
score11 
Overall 
performance12 
Budget for primary 
education (Tsh.) 
Budget for health 
(Tsh.) 
Mkuranga  4 65.8% 17,352 6,016 
Rorya n/a n/a 13,061 2,155 
Table 4: Performance levels of councils included in the Study 
Source: Local Government Information (LOGIN) Tanzania; www.logintanzania.net 
Color codes: Green=high score; Orange=medium score; Red=weak score 
Budgets for primary education and health are given in Tanzanian shillings per capita, 2007-8 
Color coding of performance results reflects LOGIN Tanzania’s assessment, whereby 
councils are rated either as “clean” (indicated by the green color), “qualified” (in orange 
color), or “adverse” (in red color), in diminishing order of satisfactory performance.  As most 
councils in the sample scored differently according to the three indicators selected, the Study 
Team calculated a “total score” to obtain an idea of average total performance per council 
(for more detail about the calculation employed, see footnote 11).   
 
Figure 3 illustrates the location of the 15 councils included in the Study.  Councils selected 
for Phase 1 only are indicated in red.  Councils selected for both Phase 1 and Phase 2 are 
indicated in green.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Map of Tanzania showing villages and mitaa included in the Study 
(Source: UN Cartographic Section, 2005) 
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4 Measuring Power Using the Power Cube 
The Study measured the character of power at local level in Tanzania using the “power cube” 
approach to analyzing power. This approach considers three dimensions of power: spaces of 
participation; forms of power; and levels of decision-making. This section describes the three 
dimensions of power in greater detail and illustrates how they have been conceptualized in 
the present Study.  
4.1 Conceptualizing Spaces of Participation 
 
Spaces of participation represent three potential arenas for participation and action, including 
closed, invited and claimed spaces; these spaces are not necessarily separate from one 
another; they are inter-related, and power can move from one to the other and back again. 
 
• Invited spaces are those spaces where there are opportunities for involvement and 
consultation, usually through “invitation” by various authorities, including 
governments, supra-national agencies or non-governmental organizations. Invited 
spaces may be regularized, that is they are institutionalized and ongoing, such as 
those found in various legally constituted participatory forums, or more transient, 
through one-off consultations. Increasingly, with the growth of new forms of 
“participatory governance”, these spaces are seen at every level, from local, to 
national policy and even to global forums, and often within organizations and 
workplaces as well (IDS, Power Pack, 17). 
 
• Closed spaces are institutions, customs, laws and places, etc. that have an impact on 
peoples’ lives but which are considered off-limits for public participation. Decisions 
are made by a set of actors behind closed doors, without any pretence of broadening 
the boundaries for inclusion.  John Gaventa refers to these spaces as “provided” 
spaces, in the sense that “elites (be they bureaucrats, experts or elected 
representatives) make decisions and provide services to “the people”, without the 
need for broader consultation or involvement” (Gaventa, 26).  
 
• Claimed spaces for participation are those which relatively powerless or excluded 
groups create for themselves – they are not creations of the “goodwill” of others. 
Claimed spaces range from ones created by social movements and community 
associations, to those simply involving natural places where people gather to debate, 
discuss and resist, outside of the institutionalized policy arenas. These spaces may 
emerge “out of sets of common concerns or identifications” and “may come into being 
as a result of popular mobilization, such as around identity or issue-based concerns, 
or may consist of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common 
pursuits” (IDS, Power Pack, 17). 
 
Table 5 summarizes the questions by which the Study asked respondents about the spaces 
of participation in their villages/mitaa, and lists the survey instruments (individual interviews 
and/or focus group discussions) in which the questions were included. 
 Power  ana lys is ,  Tanzan ia   
 
  
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
Area of 
investigation 
Question Inclusion in 
survey instrument 
All spaces Who makes decisions related to local development in your 
village/mtaa? 
FGDs; Individual 
interviews 
Have you participated in any decision-making activities in your 
village or mtaa during the past 5 years related to 
development? 
Individual 
interviews 
If Yes, what kind of forums were these?  If No, why not? Individual 
interviews 
If Yes, how did you participate? Select from: attendance only; 
information giving; consultation only; providing resources; by 
forming groups to meet objectives; interactive participation 
(joint analysis); self-mobilization (taking own initiative)13.  
Individual 
interviews 
Do you feel that you were able to influence decisions about 
development in your village/mtaa through these forums? 
Individual 
interviews 
Has the way in which decisions related to development are 
made in your village/mtaa changed during the past 5 years? 
FGDs; Individual 
interviews 
Do you feel that you have become more or less successful at 
influencing decisions in your village/mtaa related to 
development planning during the past 5 years—or has it 
stayed the same?    
FGDs 
Invited spaces 
If you have become more successful, then why is this the 
case? If you have been less successful—or there has been no 
change—what have been the obstacles? 
FGDs 
Do you feel that there are any forums in your village or mtaa 
where you are not invited to attend or participate? 
Individual 
interviews 
Closed spaces 
If Yes, what kind of forums are these? Individual 
interviews 
Are there any development planning forums being organized 
by villagers without waiting for the government? 
Individual 
interviews 
Have people in your village/mtaa ever demanded to 
participate in development? 
FGDs; Individual 
interviews 
Claimed 
spaces 
If Yes, what was the response?   Individual 
interviews 
Table 5: Conceptualizing spaces of participation in the survey instruments 
4.2 Conceptualizing Forms of Power 
 
Power manifests itself in three different forms in the power cube—visible, hidden and 
invisible. 
 
• Visible forms of power are defined as “contests over interests that are visible in public 
spaces or formal decision making bodies”. Often these refer to political bodies, such 
as legislatures, local government bodies, local assemblies, or consultative forums. 
                                               
13
 The selected participation modes are based on Pretty et al. (1995). 
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However, they can equally apply to the decision-making arenas of organizations and 
even of social movements or other spaces for collective action (IDS, Power Pack, 10).   
 
• Hidden forms of power are those where vested interests (persons or institutions) 
create barriers to participation and “maintain their influence by controlling who gets to 
the decision-making table and what gets on the agenda. These dynamics operate on 
many levels to exclude and devalue the concerns and representation of other less 
powerful groups” (Gaventa 2005, 15).  As the name suggests, these forms of power 
most often occur “backstage”, away from the spotlight and outside of visible forums of 
decision-making.  Hidden power does not only belong to dominant actors, however: 
those traditionally considered to be less “influential” typically deploy a multitude of 
hidden power strategies to obtain what they need. Indeed, for less influential actors, 
hidden power strategies are often the power instrument of choice, given that they 
often have no access to open power strategies in traditional, public forums14.   
 
• The concept of invisible power describes the ways in which power is internalized, i.e. 
the “psychological and ideological boundaries of participation”, including the adoption 
(by dominant groups) of ideologies, values and forms of behavior, as well as different 
forms of behavior by relatively powerless groups themselves, including “false 
consciousness” (in the Marxist sense) or the internalization of powerlessness” 
(Gaventa 2006, 29) or “what is acceptable” (Gaventa 2005, 15).  
 
Table 6 summarizes the questions by which the Study asked respondents about the forms of 
power in their villages and mitaa, and lists the survey instruments (individual interviews 
and/or focus group discussions) in which these questions were included. 
 
Area of 
investigation 
Question Inclusion in 
survey instrument 
What are the main obstacles that ordinary villagers (i.e., 
women, youth, small farmers, casual laborers, the poor, etc.) 
face in official forums when they try to influence decision-
making, raise questions and demand accountability and 
transparency?  
Individual 
interviews 
Have these obstacles become more or less during the past 5 
years? Please explain. 
Individual 
interviews 
Which official forums are the most important for ordinary 
villagers to be heard, to influence decision-making, to raise 
questions and to demand accountability and transparency? 
Individual 
interviews 
Why are these forums the most important? Individual 
interviews 
Which groups of people dominate discussions in these official 
forums?  
 
How do they dominate? Individual 
interviews 
Visible forms 
of power 
How successful are ordinary villagers in influencing decision-
making in official forums? 
Individual 
interviews 
                                               
14
 There is a rich body of literature documenting “hidden forms of power” by poor and less influential 
population groups. Among the more prominent theorists who describe forms of hidden power, James 
C. Scott (1990) refers to “disguised, low-profile, undeclared” forms of resistance, and Michel Foucault 
(1980) refers to the “local and intimate operations of power” or “micro-powers” that are exercised at 
the level of daily life.  
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Area of 
investigation 
Question Inclusion in 
survey instrument 
Do you think that women have gained more influence in 
development planning during the past 5 years? 
Individual 
interviews 
Do you think that men have lost influence in development 
planning during the past 5 years?   
Individual 
interviews 
Are plans for development projects followed up? Individual 
interviews 
Which information do people receive that enables them to 
participate and follow up? 
Individual 
interviews 
How many political parties are present in this village/mtaa? Individual 
interviews 
Do you think you have the ability to influence development 
planning through official forums? Please explain. 
FGDs 
Has your ability to influence development planning through 
official forums increased or decreased during the past 5 years, 
or has it stayed the same? 
FGDs 
If it has increased, why do you think this is the case? If it has 
decreased, why do you think this is the case? 
FGDs 
What are the main unofficial/informal ways, outside of official 
forums, which you have available to make your views heard? 
FGDs; Individual 
interviews 
What are the reasons why you need these informal forums? FGDs; Individual 
interviews 
Hidden forms 
of power 
Who do you turn to first when you need help in any matter?  Individual 
interviews 
Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in 
your life (in general)?  
Individual 
interviews 
Under what circumstances Yes/No? Individual 
interviews 
What is the reason for your answer? Individual 
interviews 
Are traditional leaders and religious leaders influential? If Yes, 
how so? If No, why not? 
Individual 
interviews 
Which factor gives a person more influence: money or land? Individual 
interviews 
Are leaders more advantaged in society compared to other 
people?  If yes, why? How do you explain their/your 
advantaged position? 
FGDs 
Invisible forms 
of power 
Are [women/youth/casual laborers/small farmers] more 
disadvantaged in society?  If yes, why? How do you explain 
their/your disadvantaged position? 
FGDs 
Table 6: Conceptualizing forms of power in the survey instruments 
4.3 Conceptualizing Levels of Decision-Making 
 
The power cube theory holds that different levels (or layers) of decision making and authority 
exist on a vertical scale, including at the global (supra-national), national and local levels. 
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• At the supra-national level, there are many new forms of global institutions that offer 
venues for participation and influence at levels beyond the nation-state. These may 
include formal and informal, state and non-state spaces. They include UN institutions, 
civil society networks, trade regimes, and private conglomerates.  
 
• For many observers, the national government level is still the critical entry point for 
change. It is national governments that often officially represent citizens in global 
governmental arenas, or who can decide whether or not to implement international 
treaties (IDS, Power Pack, 22). 
 
• The sub-national level comprises many decision-making arenas that are “critical 
points of leverage for holding and challenging power” (IDS, Power Pack, 23). 
Decentralization processes in many countries aim to make this level ever more 
relevant in citizens’ lives, as citizens will increasingly turn to local governments for 
access to services and political representation. Strategies for participation in local 
governance, such as those supported under the Local Government Reform Program 
in Tanzania, are very important for planning, allocating and monitoring budgets, and 
holding local institutions to account. 
 
Table 7 summarizes the questions by which the Study asked respondents about the relevant 
levels of decision-making in their villages and mitaa, and lists the survey instruments 
(individual interviews and/or focus group discussions) in which these questions were 
included. 
 
Area of 
investigation 
Question Inclusion in 
survey instrument 
Which of these structures has the most influence on 
development planning in your village? Choose from: 
IMF/World Bank; other international organizations; other 
countries; national government; political parties; NGOs/CBOs; 
religious leaders; village leadership; private sector; or other.  
Individual 
interviews 
What is the reason for your answer? Individual 
interviews 
In case of the structures mentioned, whose influence is 
increasing the most within the past 5 years?   
Individual 
interviews 
What is the reason for your answer? Individual 
interviews 
Have you heard of the Government’s “Decentralization by 
Devolution” policy? 
Individual 
interviews 
If Yes, has the “Decentralization by Devolution” policy in 
Tanzania resulted in an increase in participation by villagers? 
Individual 
interviews 
How do intra-household relations influence participation? Can 
several persons of a family attend a meeting and can they 
express differing views? 
Individual 
interviews 
Development in my village/mtaa is most influenced by 
decisions at what level?  Supra-national, national, or local 
level? 
FGDs 
All three levels 
of decision-
making 
The most important influence (on local development) comes 
specifically from who or what (level)? Explain your answer.  
FGDs 
Table 7: Conceptualizing levels of decision-making in the survey instruments 
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5 Findings for Spaces of Participation 
5.1 Invited Spaces 
 
By law the village meeting constitutes the most important “invited space” for citizens to 
discuss local development issues.  A large proportion of individual interviewees (28 percent) 
felt that decision-making related to development in their villages and mitaa takes place 
primarily at village meetings (see Figure 4).  But at the same time, almost 62 percent of 
interviewees said they felt that “local leaders” (a category including village chairpersons, ten 
cell leaders and/or sub-village leaders, mtaa chairpersons, VEOs and councilors) were the 
ones actually making decisions related to development in their villages or mitaa.  
 
Breaking down the results by respondent categories helps to explain the apparently 
contradictory perceptions about decision-making authority.  Of all individual interviewees, 
local leaders were most convinced that village meetings were decision-making forums: over 
40 percent of leaders indicated that decisions about local development were made here.  But 
other respondents were more skeptical: a majority of youth and women respondents felt that 
village chairpersons, ten cell leaders and sub-village leaders were the most important 
decision-makers; only 23 percent and 21 percent of respondents in these categories, 
respectively, believed that village meetings were the most important decision-making forums.   
 
The perception of most respondents that local leaders are the real decision-makers is not a 
completely accurate reflection of the law, in the sense that—by law—local leaders are 
mandated to formulate plans for their sub-villages and villages with the input of local citizens, 
as obtained at village meetings. Thus, local leaders are supposed to act somewhat as 
“midwives” of local plans and development initiatives, while the district level technically 
approves the local plans (see text boxes, section 2.5).  But villagers’ perceptions are 
significant for illustrating the relatively low importance they attach to the village meeting as a 
democratic decision-making forum, and the relatively high importance they attach to the role 
played by their local leaders (whether justified or not). The results could also indicate that, in 
actual fact, local leaders are superseding their role as “midwives” of local development plans 
and are dominating proceedings rather than merely facilitating them. This latter interpretation 
of the results would seem to have some credence in the light of evidence of skepticism of 
respondents about the democratic, “bottom-up” nature of village meetings (see sections 5.4.1 
and 6.2).  
 
Some local leaders take the concept of the village meeting as an “invited space” quite 
literally, as they feel that it is the “duty” of citizens to participate in the development of their 
village or mtaa:  
 
“Most people are aware of their duties [of] participating in their own 
development…The government is trying to make sure that local people are 
participating in planning their own development” (FGD for leaders, Msorwa 
village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region).  
 
“Nowadays most people are more becoming aware of their responsibility 
towards participating in their own development” (FGD for leaders, Wami 
Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region). 
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Figure 4: Who makes decisions related to development in your village/mtaa?  
(% of respondents; N = 120 individual interviewees; Phase 1) 
 
A majority of interviewees (57 percent) indicated that they had participated in decision-
making activities related to development in their village or mtaa during the past 5 years; 
Among those who had participated, a third had attended village meetings and 14 percent had 
attended “project committee meetings”.  Forty-two percent of interviewees indicated that they 
had not participated in any decision-making activities during the past 5 years.   
 
Figure 5: Have you participated in any decision-making activities in your village or mtaa during the 
past 5 years? 
(% of respondents; N = 120 individual interviewees; Phase 1) 
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However, the responses to this question varied significantly depending on the category of 
interviewees. As Figure 5 illustrates, among casual laborers, small farmers and women (non-
leaders), a majority of respondents indicated that they had not participated in any decision-
making forums.  Among youths, the number of respondents who had not participated was 
equal to the number of respondents who had participated (with two respondents not giving 
any answer).  Only among leaders was there a clear majority of respondents who indicated 
that they had participated in decision-making activities related to development in their 
villages or mitaa during the past 5 years.  
5.2 Forms of Participation 
 
For those interviewees who indicated that they had participated in decision-making activities 
during the past 5 years, a majority (35 out of 66 interviewees, across all categories of 
respondents as well as regions of the country) participated primarily in passive ways, through 
attendance, information giving, consultation, or providing financial “contributions” only.  Thirty 
respondents indicated that they had played at least some active role in the decision-making 
forums, through interactive participation and joint analysis, forming groups to meet 
objectives, or some combination of the above along with providing “resources”.   
 
Forms of participation N % 
Attendance only 11 17% 
Information giving only 10 15% 
Consultation only 8 12% 
Passive participation 
Providing contributions only 6 9% 
Combination of providing contributions, 
forming groups and interactive 
participation 
10 15% Mixed forms of 
participation 
Forming groups to meet objectives 9 14% 
Interactive participation Interactive participation and joint analysis 11 17% 
Other  1 2% 
Total N of respondents who participated in decision-making forums 66 100% 
“No answer” = 54 respondents 
Table 8: How did you participate in decision-making forums? 
(% of respondents; N = 120; Phase 1; “No answer” category represents respondents who did not 
participate in decision-making forums, as well as missing cases) 
 
Most interviewees (44 percent) indicated that they were able to influence decisions about 
development in their villages/mitaa through the forums they attended: 30 percent of 
interviewees felt they were not able to do so, 9 percent felt they were only “partially” 
successful, and 2 percent said they were not sure (see Figure 6).  
 
The confidence of respondents in this regard is perhaps surprising given the overall level of 
pessimism about the quality of participation at village meetings.  But the results must be 
interpreted with some caution.  First, there is a relatively large proportion of “no answer” 
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responses; it is possible that for many respondents, “no answer” represents a form of 
qualified “no”.  Second, the apparent contradiction might be explained in part by respondents’ 
different interpretation of the question. There is evidence that the question, “Do you think you 
have the ability to influence development planning through official forums?” was interpreted 
by some respondents as a comment on their own capacities rather than as a question about 
their degree of success at influencing decision-making.  The following example of responses 
to this question would appear to bear this out:  
 
“We are capable of running our own businesses, so we can also influence and 
initiate development plans and projects in our village” (FGD for women, Kidia 
village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Do you feel that you are able to influence decisions about development in your village/mtaa 
through official forums? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 113; Missing values N = 7; Phase 1) 
 
For those interviewees who felt they were not able to influence decisions, the main obstacles 
mentioned were “demands not being considered” (32 interviewees, or 42 percent of the sub-
sample) and “self-segregation” (11 interviewees, or 14 percent of the sub-sample).   
 
Just over half of interviewees (51 percent) said that the way in which decisions related to 
development were made in their villages/mitaa had not changed at all during the past 5 
years, versus 42 percent who thought decision-making had changed, while 5 percent replied 
that it had “partially” changed, or else they did not know.  Figure 7 illustrates that leaders 
were more convinced than other respondents that decision-making had changed: whereas 
almost 60 percent of leaders felt that there had been changes during the past five years, only 
about 40 percent of youth, 38 percent of women (non-leaders), 27 percent of small farmers 
and 25 percent of casual laborers thought this was the case.  Among ordinary citizens (non-
leaders), without exception, more interviewees felt that decision-making had not changed 
than thought that it had changed.  
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Figure 7: Has the way in which decisions related to development are made in your village/mtaa 
changed during the past 5 years? 
(% of respondents; N = 120 individual interviewees; Phase 1) 
 
In general, respondents in the FGDs were less optimistic than interviewees about their ability 
to influence decision-makers through village meetings.  For example, youths in many areas 
pointed out that their economic handicaps and their lack of access to resources impaired 
their ability to participate meaningfully in civic life in their villages: 
 
“Youth have no power to influence village development: if you don’t have 
money or land or education, how do you influence those people? For instance, 
regulations for getting agro-input vouchers are unfriendly to youth…There is 
no way [we] can get vouchers because one of the regulations to get [them] is 
that [we are] supposed to own [a plot] of land and [we] don’t own any, 
automatically, [so we] are out. Then why do [we] go to community meetings if 
decisions they make are not friendly to youth?” (FGD for youth, Mbitimikali 
village, Iringa council, Iringa region).  
 
“Youth do not have resources like employment, working capital and land that 
are most influential in development planning” (FGD for youth, Mjimwema 
village, Njombe council, Iringa region).  
 
The correlation between money and influence in participation applies also to other groups in 
the villages studied. Poor villagers, generally, complained that their poverty means they are 
taken less seriously in invited spaces than their richer fellow villagers. 
 
“Those who have big capital are listened [to] in the community, but most of us 
with small capital, we are not even considered to have any good ideas for 
community development” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, 
Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
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5.3 Closed Spaces 
 
In the case of the 42 percent of interviewees who indicated that they had not participated in 
local forums on development during the past five years (see section 5.1), most respondents 
(44 percent) said they did not feel invited to attend decision-making forums.  Another 26 
percent said there was no particular reason why they did not participate in such forums.   
 
A majority of interviewees (56 percent) felt that there are forums in their villages or mitaa (i.e. 
forums not only restricted to village meetings) where they are not invited to participate in 
decisions related to development; 37 percent disagreed that there are such forums.  As 
Figure 8 illustrates, as in other areas, there is a discrepancy between leaders and other 
respondents. A majority of leaders (almost 60 percent) felt that village forums were open to 
all citizens. In the case of all other respondents, however, the views were the reverse: a 
majority of ordinary citizens felt that village forums were closed off to them.  Youth were the 
most skeptical: 73 percent of youth respondents felt that they were not invited to village 
forums.  Fifty-seven percent of small farmers, and 55 percent of women interviewees thought 
the same.  The perception of closed spaces might also be interpreted as a form of hidden 
power possessed by leaders (see section 6.4.1). 
 
 
Figure 8: Do you feel that there are any forums in your village or mtaa where you are not invited to 
attend or participate? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 119; Missing value N = 1; Phase 1) 
 
For the respondents who do not feel invited, the most commonly mentioned “closed” forums 
were project groups (31 percent) and leaders’ committees (25 percent).  Just under a quarter 
(22 percent) of these interviewees felt that village meetings and sub-village meetings were 
closed to them; 7 percent of interviewees felt that “all forums” were closed off to them.   
 
“We have never been invited to any developmental discussion meetings” 
(FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
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“[People] are not invited to attend meetings. Local development planning is 
meant for the few, not the whole community. There are meetings only when 
there are new development projects to be introduced. Few people are invited 
to attend. [People in our village] have no information on what is going on 
related to development planning of the village” (FGD for youth, Pangani 
Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region). 
5.4 The Quality of Participation in Invited Spaces 
 
Underlying the issue of frequency of participation is perhaps an even more important 
question: how do respondents evaluate the quality of their participation in open forums?  One 
striking finding is that there is a wide gap between local leaders and other respondents with 
regard to what constitutes “participation”.   
 
For leaders, participation is equated primarily with the simple attendance of village meetings. 
Typically, village leaders argue that there is participation occurring in village meetings 
because development issues are discussed there, and they claim that villagers have a say in 
decisions.   
 
“Together with villagers we discuss about development projects…Villagers 
decide whether to accept or reject development projects” (FGD for leaders, 
Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
 “Official forums is where we [make] our plans and decisions” (FGD for 
leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).  
 
“Many issues about development have been fulfilled as they were discussed 
at official forums.  People trust leaders and what [leaders] tell them at official 
forums” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
“Community members are the ones who are involved in meetings and decide 
about developmental projects of our street…they own these projects” (FGD for 
leaders, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
 
But in most cases, ordinary respondents in the same villages/mitaa contradicted leaders’ 
claims that there is sufficient participation at village meetings. 
 
“The Village Chairman and VEO are still making decisions for us without our 
consult…The Village Chairman and the Village Council are the ones who are 
making decisions about our development” (FGD for small farmers, Kidia 
village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
“Leaders don’t care about our ideas. This is because our leaders are still 
having gender biases that a woman cannot perform anything for development” 
(FGD for small farmers, Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
“We are not capable of influencing anything [any decisions]. We are afraid of 
the leaders. No one can dare to speak out. …There are no specified programs 
and villagers are not well informed of development projects. In most cases, 
the projects are overheard in community gathering and not in official meetings. 
In fact, there are no proper plans for one to make follow ups. The projects are 
ad-hoc, only leaders have opportunity to sit in their offices and plan for us. 
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…All plans are being set by the leaders. Villagers are mere implementers” 
(FGD for small farmers, Iborogero village, Igunga council, Tabora region).). 
 
“Decisions [related to development in the village] originate from the central 
government and villagers are supposed to accept… Village meetings [are] in 
the form of commanding people what to do.  We are used to [it], that 
information or ideas given by leaders should always be accepted without 
challenge” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
“We are not involved in some of the important decisions in the mtaa. For 
instance, the establishment of a water project in our place: leaders have taken 
a lot of money in that project and nothing is continuing” (FGD for youth, 
Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
5.4.1 The Nature of Participation 
 
Leaders are more convinced than ordinary villagers that village meetings are true decision-
making forums.  Results from the individual interviews illustrate that 41 percent of leaders 
believe that decisions about local development are made at village meetings, by participants 
of these meetings, rather than (solely) by local officials.  Other respondents, however, 
believe that this figure is much lower: only a third of small farmers believe that decisions are 
made at village meetings, while only 23 percent of youth respondents, only 21 percent of 
women, and only 14 percent of casual laborers believe this to be the case.   
 
 Respondent category Decisions are made by 
officials 
Decisions are made by 
village meetings (all 
participants) 
Total (N) 
Leaders 59% 41% 32 
Women 79% 21% 29 
Youth 77% 23% 30 
Small farmers 67% 33% 21 
Casual laborers 88% 13% 8 
Table 9: Who makes decisions at village meetings? 
(% of respondents; N = 120; Phase 1) 
 
The apparent contradiction in leaders’ attitudes—with on the one hand their idea that village 
meetings are forums where villagers are informed of developments rather than actively 
consulted, and on the other hand their conviction that these meetings are participatory 
nevertheless—is captured by the following quote from a focus group discussion: 
 
“Decisions are made by Councilors and the WEO, VEO and Village 
Chairpersons and the Village Meeting”… “We have influence because [we] 
respond to the needs of the people” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero Village, 
Igunga Council, Tabora region.  
 
The disconnect between leaders and most other respondents becomes clear when views are 
analyzed concerning the purpose of village meetings: most leaders believe that the main 
purpose of the village meetings is to pass on information to villagers rather than to consult 
with villagers on development plans, and to seek their views.  In this context, leaders 
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considered ”participation” by people not so much as a say in public decision-making, but as 
people’s financial contribution to the implementation of decisions made by the leaders at 
village or district level: 
 
“The people get information on new projects approved by the district and their 
role—if it is cash contribution, labor or if they are the beneficiaries and how 
each one will benefit” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, 
Tabora region).  
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that many ordinary villagers associate “participation” with 
mandatory “contributions” of money and, in some cases, labor.  These contributions, 
moreover, are often for projects that many feel do not even reflect their own interests: 
 
“Development projects are not transparent. We are not even aware of those 
development projects. All plans are with our leaders. People are not well 
informed about the projects. The development projects become known to the 
villagers when the leaders need financial contribution…In most cases, the 
projects are not peoples’ development priorities. For instance, we demand a 
market as a priority, but it has not been well considered by the leaders”. 
“Leaders do not provide information: we would like to participate but it is not 
so easy in this particular village” (FGD for women, Iborogero village, Igunga 
Council, Tabora region).  
 
 “All leaders at mtaa to district level are corrupt, they always decide for their 
benefits, they don’t involve local community in any developmental decision 
making processes; local community are involved at the end if they need cheap 
labor or by contributing some amount of money” (FGD for local business 
people, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
“Fishermen’s problems are not considered during community meetings except 
when it comes to paying tax” (FGD for small scale fishermen, Pangani 
Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).   
 
“The only transparent things here are contributions needed, not those 
collected” (FGD for women, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).  
 
5.4.2 The Outcomes of Participation 
 
In just a few areas, the Study found that a majority of respondents appeared to be satisfied 
with the outcome of their participation in invited spaces.  
 
For example, in the one-party (CCM) dominated village of Msorwa, 30 km from Dar es 
Salaam, almost all respondents in their FGDs (except for the women) claimed that villagers 
participated in village meetings and were successful in influencing development outcomes, 
as the following excerpts from the FGDs for small farmers and youth make clear. 
 
“People are ready to participate in development...They know what 
development is, and they know that it is their right to participate in 
development planning…. [In the past 5 years, people have become more 
successful in influencing decisions in the village]: when they need something 
they are ready to make sure it is done. [People] were able to build a 
 Power  ana lys is ,  Tanzan ia   
 
  
 
 
 
28 
 
secondary school and make sure the village demarcations are put clear” (FGD 
for small farmers, Msorwa village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region).  
 
“The contribution of youth participation in development planning has increased 
over the past five years…We are becoming more successful at influencing 
decisions in village development planning. We have realized that change is 
possible and have decided to [become] involved in political leadership. About 
80% of village leadership are youths, including the village chairperson…For 
example, we influenced the construction of a cashew nut godown because 
most youths are involved in the cashew nut business. Later on, when the ward 
secondary school was established, there was a need [for] a temporary 
dormitory. It was suggested by the VDC that the cashew nut godown be used 
as a temporary dormitory. When [the proposal came] to the community 
meeting, youths rejected strongly the idea” (FGD for youth, Msorwa village, 
Mukuranga council, Pwani region). 
 
Moreover, in the village of Wami Dakawa, 30 km from Morogoro town, women and youth 
respondents were quite positive about the follow-up by local leaders to requests for 
development projects by villagers. As in Msorwa village, it is noteworthy that youths have 
assumed (certain) local leadership positions: 
 
“People demanded to construct a police station; after completion of the police 
station the government provided policemen.  People [also] requested water 
project from the government and it was provided” (FGD for women, Wami 
Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).  
 
“Villagers do make decisions…We have become more successful [at 
influencing development] as many youths have got positions in village 
leaderships since 2009” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero 
council, Morogoro region). 
 
But even in Wami Dakawa village, where villagers were somewhat optimistic about 
influencing development outcomes, respondents mentioned that it is difficult to motivate 
people to participate in development: 
 
“Few meetings are held and only few people are willing to attend” (FGD for 
youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).  
 
The quote from the youth discussion above reflects a broad finding across most of the 
villages included in the Study, where overall satisfaction with the outcomes of participation 
was the exception, not the rule.  In most villages surveyed, the Study found that low levels of 
participation in invited spaces are directly related to a perception by villagers that it is useless 
to engage in participation because their demands will not be met, whether or not they 
participate in village meetings.   
 
There are several underlying reasons for villagers’ sense of “indifference” with regard to 
participation in invited spaces such as village meetings (as the principal decision-making 
forum at local level).  The first reason is disappointment with past efforts at participation and 
disappointment with past development outcomes.   
 
“Our leaders are very selfish and corrupt; someone cannot be involved in any 
development project without giving something… Our leaders are not careful 
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and responsible, i.e. the market was constructed using a lot of money but it is 
now more than two years after construction that market is not in use” (FGD for 
youth, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
 “Leaders prefer to spend money acquired from development projects without 
concerting other villagers; this makes people see no significance of official 
forums....Members of village development committees do not have 
cooperation with village leaders. So ideas given by the villagers are not well 
conveyed to village leaders” (FGD for small farmers, Wami Dakawa village, 
Mvomero council, Morogoro region).  
 
“There are meetings only when there are new development projects to be 
introduced…When new development projects are initiated, only relatives of 
leaders do benefit…. Leaders have just ignored them and they [youth] have 
left everything to God. They have decided to set themselves apart and do their 
own business like fishing” (FGD for youth, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani 
council, Tanga region).  
 
“We are not capable of influencing local development. [Our village leaders] are 
not confident at all, we agree at the meeting but when they go up at the Ward 
Development Committee (WODC) they say nothing except betraying our trust” 
(FGD for small farmers, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).  
 
A second reason for the apparent indifference of villagers regarding participation in invited 
spaces is the perception that local leaders equate demands for development as a challenge 
to their own authority. 
  
“Even if you demand, nothing will be done and you will be regarded as an 
enemy so it is better for us to remain the way we are” (FGD for women, 
Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region). 
 
“[We] are not free to give ideas different from those of leaders since leaders 
do not accept challenges” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, 
Mbeya region). 
 
Villagers’ disappointment with local leaders and development outcomes is acknowledged 
and understood by some leaders themselves: 
 
“We have not implemented any plan and project as suggested by community 
members due to lack of implementation fund. As a result most villagers do not 
trust us and even if you call a village meeting very few will attend” (FGD for 
leaders, Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).  
 
“Sometimes there are complaints from the villagers when development 
projects do not help them as they expected. This reduces their ability to 
influence development planning through official forums” (FGD for leaders, 
Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region). 
 
“[People] are not motivated due to lack of coordination and failure of the 
district to help the [leaders] to motivate them by accepting and working on 
their projects which villagers need” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, 
Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).  
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Ironically, village leaders hinted that they resented the distance and arrogance of district 
leaders, just as their own constituents leveled the same accusations against them (see also 
section 7.2 for more information about relations between village and high-level leaders):   
 
“The problem with our [district] leaders is that they don’t like to know problems 
of people they are ruling, they are not ready to listen our problems they 
pretend to be busy all of their time” (FGD with leaders, Kichangare mtaa, 
Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
 
5.4.3 The Struggle to Meet Basic Needs 
 
Another important reason for villagers’ indifference to participation has less to do with local 
governance, and more to do with basic economic survival: the opportunity cost of attending 
village meetings and making efforts to influence decision-making is simply too high for many 
villagers, particularly the very poorest. 
 
“[I am] not participating in development activities in our mtaa. And I don’t mind 
because I am struggling to feed my family” (Comment expressed at LGD, 
Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
“Our weakness is the result of not being educated and our poverty. Everybody 
here is poor and over-burdened by taking care of our lives” (FGD for leaders, 
Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).  
 
The burden of ordinary villagers’ struggle to meet basic needs is an important factor standing 
in the way of their empowerment.  This insight is incorporated also in other frameworks of 
power, such as that of Naila Kabeer (1999), for whom power is the “ability to make choices”.  
For Kabeer, the ability to exercise choice is composed of three interrelated dimensions, i.e. 
resources, agency and achievements.  “Resources” refers to material as well as social and 
human resources: changes in people’s resources translate into changes in the choices they 
are able to make—and hence changes in their level of empowerment (Kabeer, 436-7; 443).  
 
During the in-depth research phase, individual interviewees in the three target areas for 
Phase 2 (Kagera mtaa, Kichangare hamlet and Ilopa village) were asked what they felt the 
main obstacles were to collective action and organization by villagers (see Figure 9).  Most 
interviewees emphasized indirect, pragmatic considerations before all other factors. The 
most frequent responses were illiteracy (33 percent of responses) and poverty (20 percent), 
followed by “inadequate access to affordable agricultural inputs and micro credit” (13 
percent).  Fewer respondents mentioned direct factors affecting participation, such as “lack 
of personal interest and friendships in forming committees”, “most decisions made at ward 
and district levels”, and “inferiority complex” of villagers (10 percent of responses each).   
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Figure 9: What are the main obstacles to better organization by villagers? 
(% of respondents; N = 30; Phase 2) 
 
In the FGDs, respondents elaborated on the linkages between participation and organization, 
on the one hand, and economic empowerment, on the other: 
 
“Lack of basic needs is one of the obstacles [to better organization among 
villagers] because people…use most of their time fending for their lives rather 
than participating in development planning” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, 
Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
“The main obstacle here [to better organization by villagers] is lack of 
necessary information, inadequate entrepreneurial skills and lack of working 
capital, including technology” (FGD for local business people, Ilopa village, 
Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
Moreover, women typically cited a combination of social and economic factors as the main 
obstacles to greater participation by women in village development, including “retrogressive 
cultural beliefs that continue regarding women as inferior figures” (even within their own 
families); “empty promises by political leaders”; and the “lack of working capital”, especially 
agro-inputs and micro schemes” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, 
Morogoro region).  See also section 6.2.1 on the socio-cultural hurdles that women face 
within their own families.  
 
In almost all villages and mitaa, women emphasized the need for economic empowerment as 
a prerequisite for boosting their levels of participation: 
 
“Most women use most of time sorting out family chores and have no time for 
village development projects. Unless women are empowered economically it 
is difficult for us to influence development planning in our village” (FGD for 
women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).  
 
 Power  ana lys is ,  Tanzan ia   
 
  
 
 
 
32 
 
In the same context, many respondents called for investment in basic services as a priority 
intervention: 
 
“The current emphasis [of] the government has been construction of 
classrooms for ward secondary and primary schools. Other village priorities 
have been forgotten, like water. Our village has a water problem, and the 
government intervention is not enough” (FGD for local business people, Ilopa 
village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
For many youth respondents, “civic education” priorities included basic elements such as 
learning to work together: 
 
“There is no togetherness among youths when it comes to raising their 
issues...Youths have not been educated on the significance of working 
together” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro 
region). 
5.5 Claimed Spaces 
 
A majority of interviewees (52 percent) agreed with the statement that villagers sometimes 
organize their own forums related to development in their villages/mitaa without waiting for 
the government; 43 percent disagreed with this statement, and 3 percent of interviewees said 
they did not know whether this was the case or not.    
 
Most “claimed spaces” (i.e., forums or institutions which relatively powerless or excluded 
groups create for themselves, without waiting for approval from official structures) identified 
by the Study took the form of self-help groups centered around income generation activities 
or emergencies.  These were found especially in the case of women and small farmers:   
 
“People organize themselves informally to get social services they need, 
especially [regarding] issues concerning with emergencies, self-help activities 
and income generating activities” (LGD and FGD for small farmers, Ilopa 
village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
Some villagers mentioned that some of these kinds of self-help groups cannot be considered 
as spaces where they make their views heard: 
 
“We do have informal structures; these are good for community 
socialization…However, we cannot use them to complain or demand anything 
from the government. For instance, we have VIKOBA, where members are 
supposed to contribute Tsh.1,500 every Friday. Then, a member can borrow 
some money and conduct any business he/she wants. We also have an 
association of “kufa na kuzikana” [a special fund for emergencies]. Members 
also contribute some money. The accountant is responsible to keep the 
money. The fund is only used when somebody passes away, or in case of a 
tragedy” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).  
 
The existence of more traditional claimed spaces centered around self-governance models 
were hard to find, particularly in the form of organized alternative forums, involving a group of 
villagers.  This has to do with the difficulties involved in collective action at village level (see 
sub-section 7.4), but it also has to do with the apprehension most villagers feel when 
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undertaking activities that are seen to be counter to what village leaders or the “government” 
is doing.  
 
Noteworthy exceptions to the finding of claimed spaces being primarily for livelihood-
centered activities were found in the mtaa of Ng’washi and the village of Bubombi.  In both 
cases, respondents mentioned that they had no choice but to form self-groups, as formal 
(government) structures and leadership channels were not serving them.  Ng’washi, where 
local village leaders are completely overruled by municipal officials in Mwanza and all mtaa 
residents (including leaders) feel they have no influence on decision-making at all, residents 
were unanimous in saying that informal self-help groups were the only structures they have 
left to make their views heard (at least to themselves): 
 
“Local development in Ng’washi is influenced by the municipality and killed by 
it because they are here to siphon [off] everything, [including] land, 
animals…There is no alternative here [for making our views heard]...All we do 
is to ensure that we survive on our own through small groups of self-help 
[rather] than [depend] on the village leadership” (LGD, Ng’washi mtaa, 
Mwanza council, Mwanza region).  
 
The village of Bubombi has been led by opposition parties for a long time, and even the 
leaders there claimed that they were being sidelined by the district level for political reasons 
(see sub-section 7.3.1 on the influence of political parties). As a consequence, the leaders 
and other villagers there have created their own political space to discuss issues, outside of 
the formal forums dominated by government: 
 
“Formal forums are places to gather and hear lies and political jokes. But in 
our traditional gatherings and social groups we seriously discuss issues and 
[our own] issues, hence we cannot fail” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, 
Rorya district, Mara region). 
 
Many villagers in other areas mentioned that they preferred not to organize their own (self-
governance) initiatives or forums for fear of alienating their local leaders: according to many 
respondents, it is dangerous to claim spaces separate from what local leaders (and the 
“government”) are doing. See also sub-section 6.2 on why many villagers prefer not to “make 
demands”:  
 
“We do not need any informal forum because it causes conflict with the 
leaders. [We] are trying to avoid conflict with leaders by keeping silent” (FGD 
for youth, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).  
6 Findings for Forms of Power 
6.1 Visible Forms of Power 
 
A large majority of interviewees (78 percent) indicated that village meetings are the most 
important official forums for villagers to be heard, to influence decision-making, to raise 
questions and to demand accountability and transparency.  Other, less important official 
forums were thought to be political meetings and NGO meetings (9 percent of responses 
each).  The main reasons cited for the importance of village meetings is that “all villagers and 
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their leaders attend” (43 percent of responses), they are “easy to attend” (12 percent), and 
that they enable villagers to hear about development policy (12 percent).   
 
When they were asked who dominated these official forums, and how they dominated, 
interviewees mentioned, in order of importance, village chairpersons (32.5 percent), “all local 
leaders” (12 percent), “wealthy people” within the village (12 percent), and VEOs (11 
percent).  Fourteen percent of interviewees felt that “all members” dominated official 
proceedings, while 8 percent mentioned that men dominated official forums.  These people 
were found to dominate as “main speakers” (26 percent), through their monitoring and 
evaluation responsibilities (23 percent) and through final decision-making (22 percent).  
6.2 Official Forums: a Mostly Top-Down Process 
 
On the whole, individual interviewees were not very confident about their ability to influence 
decision-making in official village forums.  Almost half of interviewees (48 percent) felt that 
they were “not successful at all” or “somewhat unsuccessful” in influencing decisions in these 
forums.  Thirty-two percent felt that they were “somewhat successful” or “very successful”; 
7.5 percent of respondents were not sure.   
 
A breakdown of the results shows, once again, that there is a discrepancy between leaders 
and the rest, with leaders somewhat more optimistic than other respondents that they are 
able to influence decision-making (see Figure 10).  A majority of casual laborers, small 
famers, women and youth feel that they are “not successful at all” in influencing decision-
making in official village forums, whereas a majority (almost 50 percent) of leaders feel that 
they are either “very successful” or “somewhat successful”.   
 
 
Figure 10: How successful are you in influencing decision-making in official forums? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 105; Missing values N = 15, Phase 1) 
 
In many areas surveyed, the process of submitting and following up development plans 
seems to be a top-down exercise, where people are simply told what to do by their leaders.  
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Conversely, most villagers do not demand to participate and do not see opportunities to get 
involved, as they expect the leaders to take the initiative.   
 
Of all the focus group categories, women respondents—in villages as well as mitaa, and 
across the country—were most often pessimistic about their ability to influence development 
in their villages.  This pattern is illustrated in Figure 11 and presented in Table 10; the 
contrast between women and other respondent categories (particularly leaders) is 
noteworthy.   
6.2.1 Traditional Views about Women 
 
Many women feel that they are at a disadvantage in official forums, for both social and 
economic reasons.  At the root of the problem, for many women, are “traditional views” about 
women and their place in society.  These traditional views persist, first of all, within the home. 
 
“Not all our husbands are happy seeing their wives involved in income 
generating activities” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya 
region).  
 
“Women are not free to speak. We are busy with family issues…Men are 
leaders in our culture… In meetings women are considered like children” 
(FGD for women, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).  
 
Traditional views underpin a vicious circle that keeps women outside of the mainstream of 
civic life in their villages and mitaa. For the domestic burdens of women, which are reinforced 
by these traditional views, stymie their ability to participate properly in socio-economic life of 
their villages and mitaa (see also section 5.4.3 on the struggle to meet basic needs, and how 
this affects women, in particular).  
 
“Women suffer more. We have to wake up early [around 4:00 in the morning]. 
We have to queue. Sometimes, it reaches up to 11:00 in the morning to get 
one bucket of water. Normally, the wind mill does not work during mid-day, 
when there is no wind, and we can no longer get the water. Then we have to 
go a mile from Mbugani to search for water. We have contributed Tsh.5000 
[for the rehabilitation of the wind mill]. We have also contributed Tsh.1000 per 
household for water dam construction, and Tsh.20,000 for those who have 
livestock, but we do not know when the construction will take off” (FGD for 
women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).  
 
““[Women’s] problems are hardly heard during community meetings…We 
have been less successful because women’s influence in the village is not 
recognized. This is because our income is low and most women in the village 
lack civic education [and] hence do not know their rights. We have remained 
implementers of what is decided in community meetings” (FGD for women, 
Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).  
 
Women’s less-than-full participation in socio-economic life, in turn, reinforces their 
sense of isolation and lack of self-confidence when it comes to influencing 
development in their villages and mitaa.  
 
“As a female, [village officers] think I do not know anything about decision 
making… Normally men [in the village] want to organize themselves without 
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involving females” (Female interviewee number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe 
district, Mwanza region).    
 
“Women’s position in the community is still low… Most women are poor and 
this makes us less able to influence development planning in our village. 
There are very few activities organized by government concerning 
empowering women in this village” (FGD for women, Pangani Mashariki 
village, Pangani council, Tanga region).   
 
 
Figure 11: Do you feel that you are able to influence decisions about development in your village/mtaa 
through official forums? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 113; Missing values N = 7, Phase 1) 
 
 
Respondent category Yes Partially No I don't 
know 
No answer 
Leaders 75% 9% 13% 0% 3% 
Women 30% 7% 44% 0% 19% 
Youth 36% 14% 29% 7% 14% 
Small farmers 33% 0% 39% 0% 28% 
Casual laborers 25% 13% 38% 0% 25% 
Table 10: Do you feel that you are able to influence decisions about development in your village/mtaa 
through official forums? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 113; Missing values N = 7, Phase 1) 
6.3 Making Demands 
 
Few respondents said they had demanded to participate in development at local level and 
succeeded in obtaining what they demanded.  There were exceptions, such as in Msorwa 
village near Dar es Salaam and Wami Dakawa village near Morogoro: 
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“[People] have demanded to participate in meetings with investors in land and 
they were accepted” (FGD for small farmers, Msorwa village, Mukuranga 
council, Pwani region).  
 
“Village elders (wazee) did ask to make a committee for constructing village 
roads. They were given that chance and roads were constructed under their 
leadership” (FGD for small farmers, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, 
Morogoro region). 
 
In most cases, however, respondents indicated that making demands translates into making 
oneself unpopular with local leaders. Many villagers expressed intimidation by leaders: 
 
“Villagers are mostly afraid of leaders….Villagers are not free to air their 
views. When you dare to do so, you are being warned by the leaders, not to 
talk much “usichonge mdomo”. Otherwise, [your] life will become terrible, as 
you will be watched and followed every movement” (FGD for women, 
Iborogero Village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).  
 
“It is not worthwhile to make follow up of any development...If you do so, the 
leaders can put you in a very terrible situation. You can even be declared as 
‘non-citizen’” (FGD for small farmers, Iborogero Village, Igunga Council, 
Tabora region). 
 
Moreover, citizens’ demands are often perceived to be an infringement of leaders’ time. This 
reality is reflected even in the language used by leaders and villagers alike.  For example, in 
Wami Dakawa village, when villagers write a letter to the Village Executive Secretary 
demanding that their grievances be heard, this form of demand is commonly referred to (by 
both villagers and leaders) as “disturbing him” (FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, 
Mvomero council, Morogoro region).   
 
In other cases, villagers’ fear of leaders resembles a form of deference to hierarchy, in which 
they prefer their leaders to take initiatives:   
 
“[People here] have never demanded…they believe that anything good must 
be initiated by leaders themselves. [Local leaders] say that everything should 
pass through the leaders who should tell them what to do otherwise it is 
rumors. They say that true development should be brought up by the 
government” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya 
region).  
 
“Plans come from the top (district level). No one dares to challenge the plans. 
Whatever comes from the district, it is an order or directives for 
implementation and not for discussion... People do not know if they have the 
right to make such influence. We are used to be implementers and not 
planners. The leaders are selfish and they make themselves fearful to the 
villagers. They do this deliberately so that people can keep quiet and they can 
continue to do what they want” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni 
council, Singida region).  
 
“People in the village normally do not know how, and where to follow […] 
development projects. They always wait for TASAF people to give them 
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direction on how to implement these projects and how much to contribute” 
(FGD for small farmers, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region). 
 
Respondents—particularly women—regularly displayed a lack of confidence to demand 
anything from their leadership in open meetings: 
 
“How can [we] demand? We do not know the procedures. We see things 
happen by the government hand” (FGD for women, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza 
council, Mwanza region).  
 
“Women are not confident to speak out. Some women leaders (like the hamlet 
chairperson or those involved in the village council) talk during village 
meeting. You know it is not easy to speak in public, where everyone is looking 
at you. This needs people like you [referring to researchers] who have gone to 
school and seminars” (FGD for women, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, 
Singida region).  
 
Leaders themselves confirmed their tendency to dominate official forums and, in some 
cases, to monopolize power: 
 
“Leaders are the same for the past 15 years; how could we change if there is 
no problem? Leaders here are strong and can implement anything they want. 
All the current projects are the results of our influence.  Opposition parties fear 
to come and work here” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga council, 
Tabora region).  
 
Moreover, leaders often justified their dominance based on their superior knowledge, and on 
the relative ignorance and lack of education of ordinary citizens: 
 
“People have little understanding. They depend much on being told what to do 
by their leaders” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa Village, Kyela Council, Mbeya 
region).   
 
The top-down nature of decision-making often extends beyond the relationship between 
village leaders and citizens to the way in which higher level government officials (at district or 
municipal level) deal with village leaders.  See section 7.2 for more detail on the complicated 
relationship between village leaders and higher-up officials.   
6.4 Hidden Power 
 
Hidden forms of (“backstage”) power are available to leaders and ordinary villagers alike, 
although they take different forms.  Hidden power is also exercised in many different kinds of 
spaces, from invited spaces (official forums, such as village meetings) to closed spaces, 
where villagers congregate away from their leaders.  
6.4.1 Hidden Power of Leaders 
 
Leaders themselves identified their greatest source of hidden power to be their ability to go 
house to house to persuade villagers of certain development causes.  
 
“We influence development planning by lobbying individual local people from 
house to house. For instance, [for the] “Malaria Haikubaliki Campaign”, official 
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forums were not enough, we had to go house to house lobbying people to use 
mosquito nets” (FGD for leaders, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, 
Morogoro region).  
 
“We have several strategies to try and get people to accept projects, including 
going around talking to people” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, 
Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).   
 
But perhaps the most important (unspoken) source of informal power of local leaders is their 
ability to capture petty bribes in order to perform small services for fellow villagers.  Leaders’ 
access to bribes forms a source of constant friction in their relationship with other villagers. It 
is also the main reason why most villagers believe that leaders are more “advantaged” than 
they are themselves (see also the links to invisible power, in sub-section 6.5).   
 
“Leaders are more advantaged. They benefit with the financial contribution 
intended for village projects…There is a CCM project in auction market every 
Monday. This project is bicycle parking in the market, and anyone who enters 
the market with a bicycle has to park and pay Tshs.200….Leaders benefit 
from this project as they do not account for the revenue collected” (FGD for 
women, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).  
 
“Leaders are still asking for “kitu kidogo” (bribes) to help you effectively… For 
instance, at the beginning of this year, we were requested to bring introductory 
letters for us to get a loan from the bank, but what happened [was that] for 
each introductory letter we were supposed to give Tshs.20,000 for mtaa 
leaders to write that letter which actually is a bribe” (FGD for local business 
people, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
But the cycle of petty corruption does not end there.  Leaders, too, admit to “giving some 
amount of money to district leaders” and to “calling and negotiating with top leaders” in order 
to get things done (FGD with leaders, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).   
 
A related aspect of leaders’ hidden (informal) power is their ability and willingness to perform 
special favors for villagers.  This mechanism of power may be regarded as the “flip-side” of 
the hidden power mechanism of petty corruption wielded by villagers (see next sub-section).  
In this case, both leaders and villagers may be said to have a form of “symbiotic” hidden 
power relationship, where an individual villager’s hidden power to bribe is nurtured by a 
leader’s hidden power to resolve issues informally for an individual villager.   
 
The following examples demonstrate how this form of hidden power resembles a kind of 
“patronage” available for local leaders to dispense when they please: 
 
“People come to [an] individual leader to get support, [for example] when they 
face problems of land, we can resolve the differences unofficially. This is done 
at one leader’s home” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, 
Tabora region).  
 
“Women and youths demanded to contribute their labor power on building a 
secondary school. They do this expecting that in case there is a new project 
they may be among the beneficiaries. They were accepted” (FGD for leaders, 
Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region). 
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Another instrument of leaders’ hidden power is their access to information, and—as this is 
related—their power to keep information from their constituents.  Villagers are near 
unanimous in insisting that local leaders keep them in the dark about taxes collected, income 
generation schemes, development plans and financial reports. Many villagers feel that this 
lack of transparency inhibits their ability to participate fully in development planning.   
 
“[Leaders] are the ones who are collecting some of [our] taxes and they don’t 
give back [a] financial report” (FGD for women, Ding’wida village, Mtwara 
council, Mtwara region).  
 
“For the past 20 years we haven’t heard any financial report in any meeting 
within our township council” (LGD, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, 
Kilimanjaro region).  
 
“Information provided by local leaders concerning village development cannot 
be trusted because we feel that they lack transparency and accountability. 
Most of the time there is no connection between resources contributed, 
expenditure and value for money. The village water project is one of the 
examples of inadequate follow-up of development planning: the whole project 
cost Tsh.54 million and just imagine only on water well is functioning. This is a 
completely robbery (“huu ni ufisadi, wizi mtupu”) (FGD for youth, Mbitimikali 
village, Iringa council, Iringa region).  
 
Just as local leaders are able to regulate the information flow to their constituents (at least as 
far as official information is concerned), they are also able to make ostensibly open meetings 
feel like closed spaces for many ordinary villagers (see section 5.3 on citizens’ comments on 
closed spaces in their villages).  Though many village forums—including village meetings, 
sub-village meetings and project groups—are officially open to villagers, barriers to access 
and subtle forms of exclusion make many citizens feel unwelcome.  
 
But just as some of the village leaders wield “hidden power” in their relations with 
constituents when it comes to creating exclusive spaces and controlling information, so do 
district leaders wield instruments of hidden power vis-à-vis village leaders.  Examples of such 
behavior by district leaders include sidelining of local (village) leaders, setting agendas 
behind the scene, and excluding certain players (see also section 7.2 on relations between 
village leaders and higher level officials).  
 
6.4.2 Hidden Power of Ordinary Villagers 
 
The most common instrument of hidden power for ordinary villagers is petty corruption, just 
as accepting bribes is an important source of informal power for local leaders. In all villages 
surveyed, ordinary respondents mentioned bribes as a way to circumvent official 
bureaucracy and to “get things done”.  
 
“Bribes are the most effective strategy to success because our leaders are 
corrupt. Without a bribe of at least Tshs.10,000 to 50,000 you cannot be 
considered by our mtaa leaders…For example, people have to give money as 
corruption to leaders in order to get birth certificate of their children” (FGD for 
women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).   
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“If you give some amount of money your problem will be solved very quickly 
without any disturbances, in every sector here at Mwanga…if you need 
service [quickly] just give something” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare 
mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
 “The best way [to get the services and resources that we need] is through 
individual efforts whereby you [are] able to influence the leaders by giving 
them gifts/ bribes or by mentioning some of our relatives in top position at 
regional level” (FGD for youth, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro 
region).  
 
Not all bribes are in the form of cash: 
 
“We sometimes offer our body to leaders for us to succeed some of our 
desire” (FGD for women, Mchangani village, Mtwara-Mikindani council, 
Mtwara region). 
 
Often, those villagers without the money to spend on petty corruption complained that they 
had no forms of hidden power.  Typically, these villagers were youths, women and the 
poorest members of the community. 
  
“We don’t have sources of income so we [cannot] get some amount of money 
to give as corruption” (FGD for youth, Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, 
Mtwara region).   
 
“Women are the most disadvantaged ones…for instance, all sources of 
household income are owned by men, we use most of the time working but we 
get less. There are few opportunities for women to access agro-inputs and 
micro credit schemes” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya 
region).  
 
Other forms of informal power and organization deployed by ordinary villagers involve time-
honored and classic mechanisms such as using “contacts”, petitioning of local leaders, and 
forming small self-help groups to provide socio-economic support, as the examples below 
illustrate.   
 
“The most [common] strategies...are lobbying and networking with people you 
think can assist you [to] get what you want” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, 
Kyela council, Mbeya region). 
 
 “The best strategy to use when I’am in need to get what I want is through 
contacts. Though other strategies can be used like petitions, bribes and so on, 
but contacts simplifies because I can use my fellow/ friends of mine who is 
close to the person or institution that I need to get an aid from” (Woman 
interviewee, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region). 
 
“A group of people is [formed] and sent to the leaders to explain their 
grievances on behalf of others” (FGD for small farmers, Msorwa Village, 
Mukaranga Council, Coastal region).   
 
“Women have been meeting in self-help forums where they assist each other 
in self-help activities like establishing micro credit schemes and working 
 Power  ana lys is ,  Tanzan ia   
 
  
 
 
 
42 
 
together in farms” (FGD for women, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, 
Morogoro region). 
 
Respondents also mentioned subversion tactics as informal mechanisms of power available 
to ordinary villagers, such as illegal fishing necessitated by “inadequate working capital and 
corrupt coastal zone officials” (FGD for leaders, Pangani Mashariki Village, Pangani Council, 
Coastal region) and “escaping payment of contributions” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, Kyela 
council, Mbeya region).   
 
As a last resort, youth in particular also mentioned “voting with their feet” when they are left 
with no hope.  Migration and exit can be considered as forms of hidden power in the sense 
that they offer individuals the prospect of a better alternative to unsatisfactory present 
circumstances15.  For example, in remote Mbitimikali village in Iringa region (13 kilometers 
from the Iringa-Mbeya highway), where access to land for youths is increasingly difficult (see 
sub-section 5.2), youths mentioned that their only alternative for a better economic future is 
to migrate to urban areas: 
 
“Rural areas [are] not providing hope for youth… it is very difficult to get land 
here either from the family or community. The village leaders have sold all 
good land; nothing is left for future generations. How can you practice 
agriculture without land and agro-inputs? We have lost hope in participating in 
community meetings and about half of youth in this village have migrated into 
urban areas. We have remained few and [we] don’t think we can bring 
changes here” (FGD for youth, Mbitimikali village, Iringa council, Iringa 
region). 
 
In Mjimwema village, which is more accessible to urban areas (7 kilometers from Njombe 
Township Council headquarters, situated along the Iringa-Songea highway), migration to 
town is an option for those who wish to escape the wrath of local leaders:  
 
“Youth are still poor and do not have resources needed to influence 
development planning in the [village]…Youth also have lost hope [to be] 
involved in community development, and some are going to town because the 
rural area is becoming unfriendly to youth… If things are becoming tough in 
the village, some of us [go] to town” (FGD for youth, Mjimwema village, 
Njombe council, Iringa region).  
 
6.4.3 Informal Forums and Sources of Information  
 
In all villages studied, as was seen in sub-section 6.4.1, respondents complained that they 
received insufficient information about local development plans and projects from their 
leaders and officials, even when they attended village meetings. As a consequence, ordinary 
villagers try to make up for some of the information “gaps” by getting their information from 
informal sources, in addition to formal sources.  
 
                                               
15
 There is a sizeable literature on “exit” as a form of power for individuals, inspired by the original 
typology of “exit, voice and loyalty” of Albert O. Hirschman (1970 et al.), adapted by William Lyons and 
David Lowery (1986 and 1989), and described by Paul Rabé (2009), among others, as a strategy of 
(urban) poor individuals who perceive themselves to have better alternatives elsewhere.    
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For example, youth in Wami Dakawa village mentioned that through informal forums they 
“get time to discuss among themselves and [that] this is a chance for getting new ideas. The 
discussions are also chances for getting information on new [temporary] jobs in the village” 
(FGD for youth, Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region). Women in 
Msorwa village felt that they needed informal gatherings “to learn if there is anybody with [a] 
clear explanation of what is going on” (FGD for women, Msorwa village, Mkuranga council, 
Coastal region). 
 
The importance of informal gatherings and informal sources of information appears to 
increase the more that villagers feel barred from participating in officially sanctioned forums.  
Thus, women in Wami Dakawa village mentioned that they needed informal forums because 
they feel that their problems are “hardly heard during community meetings” (FGD for women, 
Wami Dakawa village, Mvomero council, Morogoro region).  The same is true for women in 
Iborogero village and small farmers in Bubombi village: 
 
“Leaders do not encourage us to participate in village development. They do 
not show us the way. In fact, they do not represent us or work for the people. 
Hence, informal forums can be one way of meeting and exchanging views, 
experiences and suggestions for better life in the village” (FGD for women, 
Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).  
 
“The failure of the government to help us cannot be the end of [our] life, so we  
meet to discuss politics, the government behavior, ways to sell our products, 
fish and care for our animals from thieves” (FGD for small farmers in Bubombi 
village, Rorya council, Mara region).  
 
But even in areas where respondents felt that they had access to formal decision-making 
structures, some still perceived the need for informal gatherings, as the latter have added 
functions that official forums cannot fulfill:  
 
“Not all women’s problems can be solved by official forums. We also need 
some self-help activities for different groups of women to sort out some 
problems like assisting each other during ‘gladness’ and ‘sadness’ situations 
(FGD for women, Mjimwema mtaa, Njombe council, Iringa region).  
 
“[Informal] self-help forums are needed to solve problems that cannot be 
solved during official meetings, for instance, the establishment of [a] cashew 
nut farmers association was done through unofficial forums” (FGD for youth, 
Msorwa village, Mkuranga council, Coastal region).  
 
Village leaders do not always appreciate it when villagers gather among themselves and 
organize forums outside of official structures, as is clear from the following comments: 
 
“We do not want [informal forums] because they are poorly organised and in 
most cases they lead to conflict because they are unlawful” (FGD for leaders, 
Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).  
 
“Informal forums are good for community planning if people could know and if 
they were rich to implement what we plan. But it is a wastage of time” (FGD 
for leaders, Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).  
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Figure 12 lists some of the most important formal and informal sources of information 
identified by individual interviews in the three focal areas covered in Phase 216. Additional 
formal sources of information mentioned in the FGDs include the radio and newspapers. In 
the FGDs, the most commonly cited informal sources of information for villagers included 
“women’s groups in market places” and “women’s social forums”, “kijiweni” (local pubs) and 
“vijiweni” (places around shops or markets); and “evening informal meetings at our shops or 
around the market”.   
 
The “vijiweni”, in particular, are mentioned as informal locales where “business people and 
small scale farmers meet daily” to discuss ongoing matters (FGD for small farmers, Ng’washi 
mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region) or to discuss “development proposals before they 
are proposed at community meetings” (LGD, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region). 
 
 
Figure 12: What are the most important sources of information about development in your area? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2) 
 
The informal gatherings described above (particularly the “vijiweni”, “kijiweni”, women’s 
groups, women’s social forums, and “evening informal meetings”) provide villagers with 
outlets for hidden power, but they may also be characterized as claimed spaces according to 
the power cube.  They constitute important “spaces”—in the physical or social sense, and 
often both at the same time—that are the creations of sub-groups of citizens (i.e. women or 
youth) outside of institutionalized policy arenas, where information and hence a kind of power 
or resistance are occurring.   
 
Respondents in several villages cited examples where informal gatherings and initiatives 
have led to demands of leaders or to other kinds of actions in the formal sphere:  
 
“Discussing in groups acts as a catalyst for leaders to hold meetings for 
discussing about peoples grievances” (FGD for small farmers, Mbitimikali 
village, Iringa council, Iringa region).  
                                               
16
 In Figure 12 “colleagues” refers to fellow leaders (in the case of leaders) as well as “friends” with 
whom interviewees sometimes have (informal and formal) working relations.  
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“A group of people is made and sent to the leaders to explain their grievances 
on behalf of others. [This] helps to make leaders call for meetings where 
decisions of the majority do take place” (FGD for small farmers, Msorwa 
village, Mkuranga council, Coastal region).  
 
But while in some areas villagers’ informal forums may lead to action to make demands, in 
other areas villagers mentioned that there are risks involved in informal organization, as 
informal gatherings may antagonize the local leadership (this is also discussed in section 
6.3). This perception of risk is an obvious disincentive to informal organization.  
 
“[We] do not need any informal forum because it causes conflict with [our] 
leaders. [We] are trying to avoid conflict with leaders by keeping silent (FGD 
for youth, Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region).  
 
“We do not need [informal forums]. The VEO will make sure you are in trouble 
if you keep on voicing; ask the former chairperson of the village who resigned 
because he entertained discussions” (FGD for youth, Mbugani village, 
Manyoni council, Singida region).  
 
“We usually meet during our business or other community gatherings. 
However, we normally discuss our family issues, not development issues. In 
fact, we are fearful to make our views heard. If you want your life to be safe 
and stable in this village, you better stay calm and engage [in] your affairs” 
(FGD for small farmers, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).   
6.5 Invisible Power 
 
This Study identified at least three different manifestations of invisible power: internalized 
power/disempowerment and widespread fatalism expressed by ordinary villagers, and a 
cultural form of power attributed to leaders as a result of their access to certain economic 
advantages.  
6.5.1 Internalization of Power Norms 
 
Much of the frustration expressed by ordinary villagers with regard to the unsatisfactory 
processes of participation, as captured in the sections above, reflect their underlying feelings 
of internalized powerlessness. These feelings are psychological, and can be defined as 
invisible forms of disempowerment according to the power cube.   
 
Two different forms of “lack of agency” might be distinguished here.  The first is directly 
related to internalized disempowerment embedded in norms and beliefs.  Into this category 
belong women’s lack of self-confidence and pessimism about their right to influence as a 
result of “retrogressive cultural beliefs that continue regarding women as inferior figures”, 
both within the home and within society at large, as well as women’s lack civil education and 
lack of awareness of their rights. Into this category also belong the feelings of youth that they 
are too young for their opinions to matter and for their input to be taken seriously by village 
elders and leaders.  Another example of norms and beliefs at work is villagers’ lack of 
confidence that they will be taken seriously because they are illiterate, uneducated and 
“peasants”.   
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A second form of lack of agency is related less to cultural beliefs and patterns (i.e. social 
norms) and more to poor leadership or limitations in the formal participation process. This 
category includes villagers’ fear of leaders (“we are afraid of the leaders; no one can speak 
out”); villagers’ refusal to demand to participate, as they do not see opportunities to get 
involved, and as they expect their leaders to take the initiative; people believing what they 
are told (or not told), related to the withholding of information; people’s belief in hierarchy and 
the power of leaders (“people do not know if they have a right”); and villagers’ widespread 
feelings of indifference (as a result of past disappointments with the participation process).  
There seems to be a relationship between these types of fear and self-doubt (what 
Veneklasen and Miller would characterize as a lack of “power within”) and the lack of claimed 
spaces and poor or absent collective action (lack of “power with”)(see section 9.3).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum of internalized power, local leaders’ accepted notions and 
discourses of participation can be regarded as examples of internalized (invisible) power.  
These include leaders’ use of one-way communication at village meetings (“informing 
people, rather than seeking their views and inputs”), and their power to obtain villagers’ 
contributions for development initiatives, to name but a few.  
6.5.2 Fatalism among Ordinary Villagers 
 
As a measure of the “psychological and ideological” dimensions of invisible power, the Study 
sought to gauge whether villagers were optimistic or pessimistic about their ability to 
influence circumstances in their lives in general.  The assumption was that a large degree of 
fatalism would indicate a negative predisposition to change, including the ability to shape 
one’s own destiny.  Conversely, a low level of fatalism might indicate openness to the idea 
that circumstances can change—including those affecting one’s own life.   
 
Responses to the question, “Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in 
your life (in general)?” demonstrated that villagers are fairly evenly divided about their ability 
to actively influence events in their own lives.  A slight majority of respondents (54 percent) 
indicated that they feel confident about their ability to influence events, while 37.5 percent 
disagreed and another 8 percent of respondents were uncertain. But the responses varied by 
respondent category, with a large gap between leaders and other groups.  It is striking that 
(once again) women are more fatalistic than any other respondent category: a majority of 
women interviewees (55 percent) believed that they were not able to influence what happens 
to them in their lives.  Youths and small farmers were less pessimistic than women, but not 
as optimistic about their ability to influence their lives as leaders. 
 
At the very least, there is no evidence that most villagers in the survey areas suffer from 
“false consciousness” (in the Marxist sense) in their relationship with those they consider to 
be powerful.  There appears to be no sense of awe—in the sense of a fundamental 
humility—on the part of those who consider themselves to be “disadvantaged” vis-à-vis those 
they consider to be “advantaged”.  To the contrary, ordinary villagers display a healthy dose 
of skepticism and irony towards their leaders, which appears to indicate that they are well 
aware of their leaders’ failings even if they realize they can do little (in the short term, at 
least) about their leaders’ dominance.   
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Figure 13: Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in your life (in general)? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 120; Phase 1) 
 
6.5.3 Economic Privileges as Cultural Forms of Power 
 
A third source of invisible power and (its flip side) disempowerment relates to access to 
economic assets. Key economic resources such as material benefits, money or land provide 
a high degree of unspoken, invisible power to their possessors. This process has been 
described by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in his views on cultural capital as “embodied 
capital”, which holds that economic assets are symbolically translated into cultural forms of 
power17.     
 
A majority of respondents were convinced that leaders were more “advantaged” than 
ordinary villagers, mainly because as a result of their positions they could capture small 
benefits, both from villagers as well as occasionally from higher level officials.  The 
acceptance of small bribes by leaders is therefore a critical source of their invisible power, as 
is the sense of impunity (officials getting away with taking bribes) that accompanies this.  
Conversely, villagers’ inability to complain about leaders’ need for bribes (and their feeling 
that it is no use to complain because nothing will change) are critical examples of villagers’ 
disempowerment in this context.  
 
The existence of this form of invisible power was usually denied by many leaders, who 
claimed that their tasks are performed on a purely “voluntary basis”.  Evidence shows that 
leaders’ economic privileges (however small) do indeed give them the symbolic, cultural 
forms of power inherent in Bourdieu’s form of embodied capital: some leaders openly 
admitted that their functions enabled them to access both material as well as intangible 
benefits, which put them in an advantaged position relative to other villagers: 
                                               
17
 According to Bourdieu, “cultural capital” exists in three forms (embodied, objectified and 
institutionalized).  In the “embodied” state, which is the most relevant for the process of internalization 
of power akin to invisible power in the power cube, embodied cultural capital is defined as “external 
wealth converted into an integral part of the person” (Bourdieu, 18).  
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“We benefit say from gifts like mobile phones from the MP for Igunga, some 
drinks, support when you have problems, respect, and some training on many 
issues like HIV/AIDS, animal keeping etc.” (FGD for leaders, Iborogero village, 
Igunga council, Tabora region).  
 
Respondents were unanimous in mentioning that money is a much more important resource 
of invisible power than land at local level. The following responses to the question of whether 
money or land provided more influence were typical of responses by villagers in all areas:   
 
“Money can help us do any business”; “money can facilitate development in 
our village”; “with money, you can do everything you want in this world” (LGD 
and FGDs for women and youth, Kidia village, Moshi council, Kilimanjaro 
region).  
 
“Money [gives a person more influence] (“usishindane na mwenye hela”). 
Money can buy anything, even the leadership” (FGD for women, Iborogero 
village, Igunga council, Tabora region).  
 
But some respondents added that, while money is more important than land, informal 
networks might be an even more important source of invisible (perceived) power than 
money:  
 
“The influence to a person may come from your political party or money but 
more important is the way you are familiar with neighbors” (FGD for leaders, 
Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).  
 
Other respondents also mentioned that education is just as important as money: 
 
“Those with education like you [the researchers] can talk freely” (FGD for 
women, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region). 
7 Findings for Levels of Decision-Making 
7.1 The Importance of the Local Level 
 
According to most villagers it is the village leadership that has the biggest influence on 
development in their villages or mitaa (at 36 percent of responses), followed by NGOs and 
CBOs (17 percent), political parties and religious leaders (10 percent of responses each) 
(see Figure 14).  The influence of the village leadership far outweighs that of other levels of 
decision-making, such as the private sector (7.5 percent), higher-level government 
institutions (5 percent), international organizations, the World Bank/IMF (6 percent) and other 
international organizations (2 percent).   
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Figure 14: Which of these structures have the most influence on development in your village? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 120; Phase 1) 
 
Views on the importance of the village leadership did not differ significantly by category of 
respondent. All categories of interviewees felt that the village leadership was the most 
influential in their lives: over 41 percent of women respondents felt this to be the case, 
followed by 40 percent of leaders themselves, 38 percent of small farmers and casual 
laborers, and over 23 percent of youth. Youth respondents felt that political parties were 
equally important as village leaders, while casual laborers felt that NGOs/CBOs were equally 
important.  Central government institutions (“government institutions”) were uniformly 
considered by all categories to be the least influential in citizens’ lives.  
 
Most villagers also think that the village leadership is the level of decision-making whose 
influence has increased the most during the past 5 years (44 percent of responses); this is 
far higher than the increase of influence of NGOs and CBOs (17 percent), political parties (9 
percent), religious leaders (8 percent), and the private sector (7.5 percent). 
 
The most important criteria used by villagers to assess the influence of different levels of 
decision-making in their lives is, in order of importance, that institutions “treat all people 
equally” (28 percent), that they are “supportive” (27.5 percent), and that they are “close to the 
people” (20 percent).   
 
Moreover, in another sign that the village level is the closest administrative level to ordinary 
citizens—despite citizens’ difficulties to influence decision-making at village level—most 
interviewees indicated that they turn to local officials first when they need help in any 
matters. Over 60 percent of interviewees said they sought assistance from local officials, 
including in order of importance, village chairpersons (30 percent), VEOs (23 percent) and 
sub-village chairpersons (7.5 percent).  Less than 40 percent of respondents said they first 
turn to neighbors/best friends (20 percent), parents or family (11 percent) or other villagers (7 
percent) in case of need.  
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In the group discussions, some villagers admitted to not knowing exactly where decision-
making authority is located, but they nevertheless felt that decisions were made through their 
local leaders: 
 
“We don’t know who influences decisions, though our leaders at [mtaa] level 
are always deciding for us” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, 
Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
 
The importance of the local level to ordinary citizens was obvious in most areas surveyed, 
but not all.  For example, in the case of Msorwa, a village 30 km from Dar es Salaam, 
respondents attached relatively less importance to the local level: perhaps as a result of the 
proximity of the village to the national capital, the national and supra-national levels (mostly 
in the form of international NGOs) seemed to be perceived as more important levels of 
decision-making that affect this village.    
7.2 Village Leaders versus Higher Level Officials 
 
The importance most citizens attach to decision-making at the local (village) level is not 
always reflected by the actual power that village leaders enjoy.  In fact, the relationship 
between the district and/or municipal level and village leaders is often just as tense and top-
down in nature as the relationship between village leaders and their own constituents. 
 
Most village leaders—and some other respondents as well—acknowledged that it is at the 
district level where development projects are actually approved and decided: 
 
“All development plans are discussed and decided at the district level and we 
village and ward leaders are informed. We leaders facilitate development plan 
here but we inform the district for approval and then call the public meeting to 
tell the villagers on the progress and their role to the project in question. 
Sometimes we plan here but without telling the district: that must be a very 
small thing because we fear the district may change the plan and get 
ashamed. For example we planned to have people with their temporary shops 
but they were pulled down by force that they are in the road reserve” (FGD for 
leaders, Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora region).  
 
“[The district] is the one with the mandate to plan for the village and provide 
the budget to implement the plans and projects” (FGD for women, Mbugani 
village, Manyoni council, Singida region).  
 
In urban areas, the municipal level is the dominant actor.  In an example of the hidden power 
available to higher-level officials vis-à-vis lower level leaders, village leaders in Ng’washi 
mtaa (Mwanza council) complained that they are being bypassed and overruled by higher 
level officials at the municipality who enjoy better education and other resources.   
 
“[It is] hard…to work with educated people from the Municipality. Shamelessly 
they do things and become tough on us if they sense we are against certain 
ideas…It is as if there is no line between our mtaa and the Ward. They 
claimed this land in our mtaa is for the Ward, and without our authority they 
built this market. Nobody among us [leaders] can tell you who paid for this 
construction, how much it cost, and who wanted it” (FGD for leaders, Ng’washi 
mtaa, Mwanza council, Mwanza region).  
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The sidelining of local leaders in Ng’washi mtaa by municipal officials, as well as by the local 
VEO, has resulted in a further lack of transparency and accountability downward to citizens:  
 
“We just see VEO and Municipal officials coming and things happening in our 
mtaa but we are no longer calling meetings regularly. We used to call 
meetings and tell people [...] things to implement but not in the past three 
years... We are frustrated and we are no longer trusted hence we need people 
to at least know that it is not our intention to let them down but circumstances 
are forcing us to do so” (FGD for leaders, Ng’washi mtaa, Mwanza council, 
Mwanza region).  
 
This complaint was echoed by other leaders at village level:  
 
“Plans come from the top (district level, TASAF)... Local development in the 
village is mostly influenced by decisions at district level. We have not been 
able to convince the district to have reliable water, dispensary or bridges to 
this road. We have become less successful at influencing decisions... The 
district [does] what [it] wants. People are complaining” (FGD for leaders, 
Mbugani village, Manyoni council, Singida region).  
7.3 Influence of Non-State Actors 
 
The non-state actors with the most influence at local level appear to be political parties and 
civil society actors, and to a lesser extent also religious leaders, although the influence of 
each of these actors varies from area to area, and is disputed by some respondents.  
7.3.1 Political Parties 
 
In most of the villages that were part of this Study respondents indicated that the ruling party 
(CCM) as well as other political parties were active in local politics.  
 
On the whole, the impact and influence of political parties on local participation appear to be 
mixed.  Figure 15 illustrates the influence of political parties in the three areas selected for in-
depth focus in Phase 2, based on the results of individual interviews. A majority of 
interviewees in Kichangare mtaa and Ilopa village (70 percent in each case) indicated that 
parties there were influential because they “influenced development projects” and “revealed 
what needed to be done”.  By contrast, a slim majority (50 percent versus 40 percent) of 
interviewees in Kagera hamlet on Ukerewe island mentioned that they felt political parties 
were not influential because they “only fulfill their own interest”.   
 
In some areas, respondents reported that they felt that the multiple parties were having a 
beneficial impact on local governance: 
 
“We have CCM and TLP in this village. The influence of political parties on 
people’s development is that opposition parties are putting pressure on the 
ruling party to improve its performance” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, Kyela 
council, Mbeya region).  
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Figure 15: How influential are political parties in your village/mtaa? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2) 
 
But in some other areas respondents reported that opposition parties are not able to offer 
enough political counterweight to the ruling party. The perceived dominance of the CCM 
party within the local administration sometimes makes it difficult for some to differentiate 
between village administrative positions (e.g. VEOs) and CCM party positions, and it results 
in a perception of censorship in village forums.  
 
“There is nothing you can do with CCM leaders here…Meetings are not held 
here, it is always like a classroom where there is no noise accepted. No 
question, a leader selects who to ask a question hence its themselves who 
asks obvious question. That is why we , people decided not to attend the 
meetings any more” (LGD in Iborogero village, Igunga Council, Tabora 
region).  
 
 “There is absolutely no change [in the way that decisions are made]. People 
are not involved in decision making. Everything is planned and decided by 
leaders, specifically [CCM] party leaders” (FGD for women, Iborogero village, 
Igunga Council, Tabora region).  
 
“The most influential party is CCM because it influences all village 
development planning like health center and ward secondary school” (FGD for 
women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region). 
 
In Bubombi village, which is ruled by an opposition party, the leaders complained that they 
were being sidelined and intimidated because of their political affiliation: 
 
“Leaders here are not listened [to]; we are thought [of] as people from the 
opposition party... We are isolated because they label us as opposition and 
tough people...Our powers are being sidelined by the [District] ED, who 
threatened our very existence; the [District] ED has money and police to 
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intimidate us all” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara 
region).   
 
Several respondents felt that, in their areas, political parties were “very influential” but that 
their impact was beneficial: 
 
“[Political parties] are very influential since they educate local communities 
about human rights, character of a good leader and reveal some critical issues 
like corruption within the community” (FGD with leaders, Kichangare mtaa, 
Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
 
“Political parties have much influence on the decision making at village level 
because all development projects in this village have been influenced by the 
ruling party” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region). 
 
On the other hand, according to some other respondents the importance of the political party 
factor was minimal in their areas as political leaders are “all the same”.  
 
“Political parties in this mtaa are not influential here. We see leaders crossing 
from one political party to another but they are the same. May be this year we 
can see some differences as Chadema has come into the district seat but, as 
a leader from CCM, I can assure you, wait and see if anything will [change]” 
(Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).  
 
While there was little consensus among respondents regarding the level of influence of 
political parties, it is noteworthy that the majority of respondents thought that there is little 
tolerance of opposing political views by local leaders in their villages.  
 
 
Figure 16: Are opposing views on issues accepted by the leadership at local level? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2) 
 
Most respondents signaled that opposing political views are regarded with suspicion, even in 
those areas with a presence of multiple political parties. Among individual interviewees in the 
Phase 2 focus areas of Kichangare mtaa, Kagera hamlet and Ilopa village, 44 percent 
indicated that opposing political views cannot be accepted, while only 13 percent said that 
opposing views are usually accepted.  Forty-three percent said that such views might be 
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accepted, but that it depended on what the views are that are expressed (see Figure 16).  
Local leaders in some of the villages studied during Phase 2 (i.e. Ilopa village) even openly 
acknowledged that there was no space at all for opposing views.   
 
However, respondents also hint that differences between parties might not always be political 
or ideological in nature; rather, they might (also) reflect the competition of rival personal 
fiefdoms. 
 
“[In this village] there are no opposing views noted already” (FGD for leaders, 
Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
[Opposing political perspectives] are viewed as a “destroyer of peace and 
security within our community” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, 
Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
 
“Some local leaders are turning local leadership into a personal 
business...Corruption [exists] among local leaders. They have sold all 
community lands and the money is not seen” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa 
village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
7.3.2 Civil Society Organizations 
 
Civil society organizations (comprising local community based organizations as well as local 
and international “NGOs”, with the latter being the civic organizations most familiar to 
respondents) have a presence in most of the villages and mitaa studied.  Their presence at 
local level, in terms of size and impact, varies from small operations by a single CBO or NGO 
(with minimal impact) to multiple development projects operated by numerous organizations 
(with a larger impact on the village).  
 
Opinion is mixed as regards to the relevance and impact of civil society organizations.  In 
areas where these organizations are most active their contribution is deemed to be positive 
and influential—and even a substitute for (absent) government efforts—as these groups 
provide much-needed community education, including in community participation, which is 
welcomed by almost all respondents. Conversely, in areas where civil society organizations 
are absent or few in number, respondents assess their impact to be negligible.  
 
“[NGOs] always provide seminars to educate local community on the 
importance [of] participating in development initiatives and plans within the 
community...They are active in promoting the use of condoms, to be faithful to 
our partners, they are educating people to participate in local community 
development initiatives and on environmental conservation” (FGD for casual 
laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
 
“[The biggest influence comes from] street leaders and non-governmental 
organizations. For instance KIMWAMU Is a non-governmental organization 
which provides help to vulnerable children in our district…Local leaders are 
the one who are aware of our problem though they don’t have funds to 
implement our suggested projects [in contrast to NGOs]” (FGD for casual 
laborers, Mchangani mtaa, Mtwara council, Mtwara region).  
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7.3.3 Religious Leaders 
 
Religious leaders are considered to have comparatively less power than village leaders and 
local officials, although they have more power than traditional leaders.  As with civil society 
organizations, the influence of religious organizations and leaders varies in each area 
according to local leadership and activities deployed. In many areas, religious leaders are 
credited with assisting villagers with small development initiatives and with providing civic 
education, although their influence is felt primarily within their own congregations.    
 
“The religious leaders are very influential. They sensitize people to participate 
in development projects...They have constructed a building with small rooms 
around the mosque and [they] encourage community members to initiate 
small businesses for their development” (FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, 
Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
“Religious leaders, especially Roman Catholics, are influential in village 
development planning. For example, they have invested lots of money in the 
project of people affected by HIV/AIDS” (FGD for women, Mjimwema mtaa, 
Njombe council, Iringa region).  
 
“Religious leaders are influential to their church members only, not to the 
whole community” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya 
region). 
 
In some areas, however, there was just as much criticism of religious leaders as of 
government officials: 
 
“Religious leaders too have become more of business people with no 
attraction at all. Can anyone here say we have any Pastor who is reliable?” 
(FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya council, Mara region).  
 
“We have never heard religious leaders encouraging development issues” 
(FGD for youth, Mbitimikali village, Iringa council, Iringa region).  
7.4 Collective Action versus Self-Development  
 
As a result of widespread frustration with the process and outcome of participation in official 
structures, many villagers in several of the areas studied say they have abandoned their faith 
in the merits of participation and collective action.  Instead, they are relying mainly on 
individual initiative—which some respondents term “self-development”—to meet their needs.  
This phenomenon was investigated in more depth during the second phase of the Study, in 
three villages selected randomly: the hamlet of Kagera on the island of Ukerewe (Lake 
Victoria), Mwanza region; Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga township authority, Kilimanjaro region; 
and Ilopa village, Kyela council, in Mbeya region.   
 
In the three areas selected for in-depth study (Phase 2), “self-development” took the forms of 
petty bribery of leaders and officials (the number one strategy in Kagera hamlet and 
Kichangare mtaa), involvement in social networks (the number one strategy in Ilopa village), 
and to a lesser extent in all three areas, using networks of relatives.  An illustration of the 
relative popularity of various self-help strategies, as indicated by individual interviews, is 
presented in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17: When you use your individual efforts to get what you need, which strategies are the most 
effective? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2) 
 
In some cases, the resort to self-development appeared to be primarily a coping strategy 
necessitated by the absence of any alternatives. For example, in the village of Ding’wida—a 
poor village lacking many services, with a newly created administrative structure—many 
respondents are forced to rely on their own initiative simply because so few collective 
structures are operational at village level. This situation applies also to other villages selected 
for this Study.  
 
“Our leaders are not willing to call a meeting to discuss development projects 
and plans for our village… We don’t have development projects and plans. 
[There is] misunderstanding among villagers themselves. … We are solving 
our problems [by] ourselves in the village” (LGD and FGD with small farmers, 
Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region). 
 
“The village is very young and we have not done any developmental project in 
our village. We are capable of organizing development projects though we 
don’t have funds for implementation. Villagers are disappointed with 
government and they do not believe any promise from our top leaders” (FGD 
with leaders, Ding’wida village, Mtwara council, Mtwara region). 
 
“We are denied the opportunity to give out our views, ask questions or provide 
suggestions, for the betterment of our village. Now, villagers are more apt to 
self development than village development” (FGD for small farmers, Mbugani 
village, Manyoni council, Singida region).  
 
In the three areas randomly selected for in-depth investigation, most attempts at collective 
organization by villagers have failed.  Self-development by villagers in lieu of participation 
arises for different reasons. In the hamlet of Kagera—as in Ding’wida village—villagers seem 
to go their own way as a result of poor and/or absent leadership at village level.   
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“Villagers have tried several times but the way the leaders treat them …they 
have come to an end now. They have decided to do development individually. 
Participation is here, but at the family level, so we can always encourage each 
other to participate fully but more must be expected from [us], the leaders” 
(Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).  
 
In Kichangare mtaa, respondents signaled fear of their leaders, and frustration with their 
leaders’ seeming lack of interest in the mtaa’s development.  The fear and frustration 
appears to stymie any motivation for collective action and results in a kind of tyranny of low 
expectations: 
 
“We are satisfied with conditions we are living with, though, even if we attempt 
as a group to demand or influence decision making, nothing will be considered 
because our leaders are always ignoring our contribution because of our 
duties” (FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, 
Kilimanjaro region).  
 
“Participation from local community is not that effective since some of us are 
still scared to demand [our] right, [while] others are discouraged that even if 
you struggle to get something it will not happen to have what you have 
struggled for” (FGD for women, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, 
Kilimanjaro region).  
 
“We are not involved and [not] even invited to participate by giving ideas, 
though [leaders] always need us to contribute some amount of money for 
some project to be fulfilled” (LGD in Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, 
Kilimanjaro region).  
 
In Ilopa village, the local and district leaderships have shown themselves to be more 
supportive of collective demands by villagers.  Women’s (informal) self-help groups, in 
particular, have been active and quite successful with regard to income-generation activities. 
The main problem here is that villagers’ attempts to organize have so far suffered from (what 
respondents describe as) “lack of unity”.   
 
“[Small farmers organized to make a] collective demand to influence [local 
decision-makers] to access agro inputs and markets for farmers, but this has 
remained at an individual level because we don’t yet have an organization that 
can officially represent us…The local authority was supportive [as they] tried 
to register our village in the government agro-voucher payment to assist 
farmers in this village, but so far the process is unrewarding…The lesson 
learned from this attempt is that if we want to succeed in influencing local 
development in this village we should organize ourselves and work as one 
group” (FGD for small farmers, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).   
 
“Collective demands [such as women’s self-help groups’ proposal for a palm 
oil extractor through TASAF] are more effective through informal structures 
like our women groups…but when we put collective demands on formal 
forums then it becomes a problem [as the proposal was not selected as a 
priority at the village meeting]. Sometimes we think that men do not 
understand us because those two projects could also assist them” (FGD for 
women, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region). 
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“Most informal collective demands are successful here in the village because 
we organize ourselves without the influence of local leaders, but there are 
very few formal collective attempts that have brought up fruitful results… 
There is very little follow up of village development planning” (LGD, Ilopa 
village, Kyela council, Mbeya region). 
 
In all three areas, a common theme was that most respondents seemed to believe that the 
reason for the rise in own initiative lies also with the failure of villagers’ own capacity for 
collective organization and even with the “character” of their fellow villagers: 
 
“Nowadays everyone fights for [him or herself], [unless they require help from 
officials].  The main obstacle [to better organization by villagers] is 
selfishness…80 percent of villagers of this mtaa have got this character… 
These people fail even to form a clan organization” (Interview with local 
business person no. 1, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region). 
 
“In [this] mtaa we have still have a problem of poor organization: no clear 
organization has been formed by the people in this mtaa. This is [because of] 
lack of education [for] the people about the importance of village 
organization…lack of ideology, financial poverty and selfishness” (Interview 
with local business person number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, 
Mwanza region). 
 
“Obstacles [to better organization] in my mtaa include poverty within the 
member group, carelessness which is caused by being not educated, lack of 
unity and having no clear decision” (Female interviewee no. 2, Kagera hamlet, 
Ukerewe district, Mwanza region). 
 
“Individual effort [is easier than collective effort]. This is because it’s simple to 
express yourself, to avoid some group conflict that may arise, and [it is easier] 
to give a bribe to respective leaders [as an individual] than as a group” (LGD 
and FGD for casual laborers, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro 
region). 
 
“People fail to participate in village development planning because they fear 
contributions that will accompany [such] planning. Illiteracy and inadequate 
information and [lack of] civic education [are some] of the obstacles that we 
have in this village that [characterize] people’s participation in development 
planning” (FGD for leaders, Ilopa village, Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
 
Past efforts at collective action by villagers in all three areas have been limited, or else have 
foundered, because of a variety of internal problems.   
 
“Villagers do organize, but the problem is that only people of the same 
interest, class or status organize together. For example, educated people 
have established a certain training center over there with no any other” (Youth 
interviewee number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region). 
 
“The main obstacle as I experienced from before is difference in priorities. I 
believe that everyone has his/her own priorities so it is difficult to organize 
people with different views and priorities. And I know even myself I cannot 
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accept this organization because it is just a wastage of time” (Youth 
interviewee number 2, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza region).  
 
“We have puppet community members who always report some of our plans 
to leaders, as a result it leads to failure of [our] plans” (FGD for women, 
Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
 
“A group has power compared to an individual, though it is difficult to organize 
community members in a group given that people are afraid to be watched as 
enemy by our leaders with in the mtaa” (FGD for local business people, 
Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region). 
 
“[Youth in this village] are not ready to organize ourselves as a group and do 
something. The problem with us [is] everyone wants to go his/her [own] way, 
which [has] proved to bear unfruitful results” (FGD for youth, Ilopa village, 
Kyela council, Mbeya region).  
8 Conclusion 
Many of the reforms that are part of the Local Government Reform Program have been 
successful in encouraging greater local-level participation in development projects. The 
positive impact of the LGRP so far includes an increase in political competition, at least in 
parts of Tanzania, greater participation of citizens in local decision-making, and an increased 
role for village governments (relative to district and higher levels of government) in the affairs 
of villages.  
 
But some of the broader changes required to cement the LGRP, including the deepening of 
democracy, increasing the demand for transparency and accountability, and addressing 
issues of elite capture, etc., will require much more time to take hold. In an illustration of this, 
the Study has presented a somewhat somber picture of the character of power and the 
avenues of participation available to ordinary citizens in villages and mitaa of Tanzania.   
 
Some of the main findings of this Study have been previously confirmed in the existing 
literature on development and participation in Tanzania. Other findings are newer and 
perhaps more surprising.  The conclusion of this Study summarizes both sets of results 
(familiar as well as “new”).    
8.1 Familiar Themes in the Development Literature 
 
In the literature on decentralization and participation in Tanzania, three themes in particular 
have echoes in the findings as presented in this Study.  The first is that there is a long 
tradition of centralized planning in Tanzania, and that this tradition is reflected—to varying 
degrees—in the current practice of local development planning.  The second is that the 
current practice of “participation” at local level is of a different kind than the one espoused by 
many (Western) development organizations.  And the third theme is that participation—such 
as it does occur in local development planning—is often accompanied by patronage and lack 
of transparency.  These three themes are briefly touched on in sub-sections 8.1.1 through 
8.1.3 below.  
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8.1.1 A Legacy of Top-Down Development 
 
The present Study recorded widespread frustration among ordinary villagers with the lack of 
opportunities for true (bottom up) participation and inputs in local development. To a certain 
extent, the prevalence of top-down decision-making is part of a long legacy of central 
planning in Tanzania.  Already in the 1970s, it was noted (for example by J. Samoff, 1974) 
that Tanzania’s system of development planning was top-down (from the central to district 
and then to village level) and that local councils failed to translate national policies in local 
terms: Samoff pointed out that local leaders merely acted as facilitators and counselors, and 
not as agents of mobilization and change. 
 
More recently, A.S. Norman and L. Massoi (2010) investigated community involvement in 
local planning processes in Tanzania within the context of the decentralization reforms. They 
concluded that the contribution of the “grassroots” level to decision making is minimal and 
ineffective.  In principle, the village meeting—the most common “invited space” at local 
level—can serve as a mechanism of social accountability. But in practice its role seems 
constricted: there are no documented examples of the village meeting overruling decisions 
by village leaders (REPOA, 2007). The village meeting’s power to remove any village council 
member is infeasible as no mechanisms exist for the adoption of the procedure before the 
end of the tenure of councilors (REPOA, 2007). Thus the meeting has no tool to keep 
councilors’ actions in check. Further, the law directs the village meeting to be called every 
three months. This means that in one year only four meetings can be convened, which may 
not be enough for ensuring participation and information sharing. Finally, when the village 
meeting actually meets, its role is considered ineffective and citizens feel they have no 
influence in setting the village plans (Chaligha, 2008). 
 
In urban areas, there is no exact equivalent of the village meeting. Though the law directs 
mitaa to meet every two months and to submit meeting minutes to the WDC, the mtaa’s role 
appears to be to implement decisions already made by the higher authorities. This practice 
has turned out to be a source of frustration for the leaders in the mitaa selected for the 
present Study, especially in Kichangare hamlet.  As Amon Chaligha also found, mitaa 
citizens do not seem to have decision-making powers over matters affecting their lives: mitaa 
residents surveyed reported only being involved in the implementation of centrally made 
plans that did not include their priorities. Chaligha’s respondents argued that instituting 
community involvement in planning process would lead to an increased ownership of 
projects, accountability, sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency of the process. 
8.1.2 Different Interpretations of “Participation” 
 
Participation as “duty” is a rallying cry of many of the local leaders interviewed in this Study; 
at another level, ordinary villagers have shown themselves to be increasingly frustrated with 
the notion of “participation as contribution” without the quid pro quo of actual decision-making 
that would be expected to be its natural corollary.  According to R. Marsland (2006) at least 
two contradictory meanings of participation are commonly used in Tanzania. The first, 
concerning “empowerment” and citizens’ involvement in local decision-making, is associated 
with international development discourse.  The second, concerning the obligation of 
Tanzanian citizens to contribute to the development of the nation (kujenga taifa), can be 
traced back to African socialism and Julius Nyerere’s concept of self-reliance (kujitegemea).  
 
Marsland concludes that the notion of participation is not adopted at the local level in 
Tanzania in a pure form according to international development organizations. Rather, the 
existing historical and cultural context influences the accepted meanings of participation. In 
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particular, participation is necessary because of the lack of government resources, but 
citizens are not expected to become too independent of the government, nor are they to be 
trusted to make decisions for themselves. As a result, the power struggles between the 
government and local actors cannot be understood within a framework that analyzes 
international discourses of development and participation alone. Insight can be gained only 
by recognizing that alternative discourses also exist and have long histories both in nation 
states and at a local level. Marsland argued that the official understanding of citizen 
“participation”—at least at the lower level—is one that literally orders citizens to contribute to 
their country’s development but not in actual decision-making.    
8.1.3 Patronage and Lack of Transparency  
 
In the study “Local Autonomy and Citizen Participation in Tanzania: From a Local 
Government Reform Perspective” Amon Chaligha (2008) argued that the key objective of the 
decentralization process in Tanzania—that is, to increase citizen participation in the planning 
and implementation of development activities at the local level—has (thus far) not been 
accomplished.  Chaligha’s study investigated six cases across the country and found that 
participation was mostly exercised through community meetings and citizen contributions of 
their labor and financial resources. The cases also highlighted the risk of citizens being 
sidelined by council authorities during public meetings.  
 
Chaligha found that, in the six councils he investigated—particularly in those with a “big 
opposition showing” (Chaligha 2008, 21)—political patronage was seen as a constraint to 
citizen participation in the formulation and implementation of council programs.  In some 
cases, council officers’ political loyalty takes precedence over support for local development 
priorities. This very same observation was also made by respondents in some of the areas 
surveyed by the present Study: 
 
“Political differences are the main obstacle. [Some] people are against good 
ideas simply because they are from an opposition party” (FGD for leaders, 
Pangani Mashariki village, Pangani council, Tanga region). 
 
Patronage and lack of transparency may be regarded as forms of hidden power possessed 
by higher level officials.  Many citizens whom Chaligha interviewed said that they did not 
have ways to hold their representatives accountable for their actions, and councilors held 
limited powers to remove non-performing or corrupt council officers. There are no effective 
instruments and procedures in place for ordinary people to use when they want to hold 
council officials accountable. The lack of citizen involvement undermines the ability of the 
councils to improve the welfare of the local population as envisioned under the Local 
Government Reform Program. The village assembly, mitaa, and vitongoji are yet to be 
strengthened to play a strong role in local governance.  
8.2 New Findings Presented by the Study 
 
Some of the most striking findings of the Study comprise issues not widely covered in much 
of the literature on decentralization and participation in Tanzania.  Six of these arguably 
“new” findings are summarized below. First, the Study could find no significant relationship 
between the quality and levels of participation and the “performance” of councils, as 
measured by central budget allocations to these councils. Second, there is a large gap 
between leaders and ordinary villagers when it comes to perceptions of participation.  Third, 
economic empowerment appears as an important building block in the political 
empowerment and self-confidence of villagers.  Fourth, petty corruption and bribery is 
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widespread in village life, and affects local power dynamics in manifold ways.  Fifth, there are 
two types of accountability structures at local level—formal and informal.  The success of 
either type of structure is mixed, and depends on local circumstances.  And sixth, on a more 
positive note, the Study has uncovered the existence of some notable “success stories” of 
empowerment involving some of the most vulnerable groups surveyed (women, youth and 
small farmers).   
8.2.1 Local Government Performance Levels and Participation 
 
As indicated in section 3, one of the main premises behind the sampling approach of the 
Study was to examine whether there was any relationship between central government 
budget allocations to councils—which are based on councils’ “performance”—and the levels 
and quality of participation in villages/mitaa in these councils.  
 
In order to test the relationship, the Study Team selected the top two councils (Pangani-
Mashariki and Iringa) and the bottom two councils (Igunga and Mkuranga) in terms of their 
“total score” (average performance score), as indicated in Table 4, section 3.   A statistical 
analysis using the chi-square test was carried out, aimed at identifying statistically significant 
differences in the level and quality of public participation between responses in the two pairs 
of extreme cases.  
 
The level and quality of participation was assessed based on responses of individual 
interviewees to five questions contained in the questionnaire for Phase 118.  In all cases, no 
significant differences were found between responses from the top two and bottom two 
councils19.  
 
1. Have you participated in any decision-making activities in your village or mtaa during 
the past five years related to development planning [Q.3]? There are no statistically 
significant differences between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of the 
level of public participation in decision-making activities over the past five years.  
 
2. Do you feel that you were able to influence decisions about development planning in 
your village/mtaa through these forums [Q.6]? There are no statistically significant 
differences between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of citizens’ 
perceived ability to influence decisions related to development planning.   
 
3. Are there any development planning forums being organized by villagers without 
waiting for the government [Q.10]? There are no statistically significant differences 
between the top two and bottom two councils in terms of forums independently 
organized by citizens.  
 
4. How successful are people such as yourselves in influencing decision-making in 
official forums [Q.17]? There are no statistically significant differences between the 
top two and bottom two councils in terms of citizens’ perceived ability to influence 
decisions in official forums.  
                                               
18
 Question numbers [Q] refer to questionnaire for individual interviewees, Phase 1 (see Appendix 2). 
19
 Chi-square (χ2) statistics for responses of interviewees from the top two and bottom two councils are 
summarized here for each of the five questions above, whereby “df” refers to “degrees of freedom” 
and “p” refers to the significance level (with 0.00 being most significant and anything higher than 0.05 
being less than statistically significant): 1) χ2 = 2,133, df = 1, p = 0.144; 2) χ2 = 4,725, df = 3, p = 
0.193; 3) χ2 = 0,784, df = 1, p = 0.376; 4) χ2 = 3,685, df = 5, p = 0.596; 5) χ2 = 2,026, df = 2, p = 
0.363.     
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5. Do you think you have influence over what happens to you in your life (in general) 
[Q.23]? There are no statistically significant differences between the top two and 
bottom two councils in terms of citizens’ perceived ability to have an influence over 
their lives.   
 
Based on the statistical analysis carried out on the top two and bottom two councils, it can be 
concluded that—at least as far as participation was measured in the five questions 
mentioned above—council performance in the three areas selected (overall council 
performance and per capita budget allocations for health and primary education) has no 
significant relationship with the level and quality of public participation in the villages and 
mitaa surveyed. 
8.2.2 A Gap in Perceptions between Leaders and “Ordinary” Citizens 
 
One of the most notable results of the Study is that—while overall findings do not vary 
significantly between different areas of the country, nor between rural villages and urban 
mitaa and hamlets—there is, however, a remarkable difference in attitudes towards 
participation between local leaders and other respondents.  
 
The discrepancy starts with the very notion of what constitutes participation. For many 
leaders, participation is equated primarily with the simple fact of villagers attending village 
meetings; this is in line with the traditional view of participation as an “obligation of Tanzanian 
citizens to contribute to the development of the nation”, as described in section 8.1.2.  The 
expectations of other villagers, however, were generally higher and more closely resemble 
the idea of participation as “citizens’ involvement in local decision-making”.  
 
In most cases, ordinary respondents felt that they have insufficient real inputs into decision-
making in official, invited spaces (primarily village meetings).  Most villagers feel that 
important decisions are made principally by local leaders, whereas leaders claimed that 
village meetings function as real decision-making forums.  Leaders also claim that village 
meetings are “open to all citizens”, while most other villagers dispute this. The perception of 
official meetings as closed spaces can be interpreted as a form of hidden power possessed 
by leaders.   
 
A majority of casual laborers, small farmers and women indicated that they had not 
participated in any decision-making forums related to development in their villages or mitaa 
during the past five years.  These same groups (and youth) also feel that they are “not 
successful at all” in influencing decision-making in official village forums.  Only among 
leaders was there a clear majority of respondents who indicated that they had participated in 
such forums.  Leaders also are more confident that others that they are able to influence 
decision-making.  Low levels of participation in invited spaces by ordinary villagers are 
directly related to a perception by these villagers that it is useless to engage in participation 
because their demands will not be met, whether or not they participate in village meetings.  
In addition, some respondents indicated feeling intimidated by village leaders and 
government officials for speaking out about their concerns during public meetings.  
 
Women (in both the individual interviews as well as the FGDs) were generally more 
pessimistic than other respondents about their ability to influence decision-making, owing to 
what they perceive as their lower social and economic status.  
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Most leaders believe that the main purpose of village meetings is (simply) to pass on 
information to villagers and to seek their contributions for development projects. But many 
ordinary respondents complain that their leaders do not share enough information. For this 
reason, most respondents feel that they need their own sources of information, as they do 
not get sufficient information through official (village) meetings and because they feel that 
they are “hardly heard during community meetings”.  The cycle of “disinformation” extends 
upwards, as village leaders, in turn, feel that they are regularly kept out of the loop by higher 
level officials. 
8.2.3 The Importance of Economic Empowerment  
 
Most respondents indicate that their economic empowerment, through better access to 
livelihood opportunities and their involvement in collective groups involved in such activities, 
acts as an important stepping stone for social and political empowerment.  The connection to 
economic empowerment is often under-emphasized in rights-based approaches and efforts 
to deepen democratic participation, and suggests that support for strategies of economic 
empowerment is vital.  Economic empowerment is also the central organizing theme in the 
case of villagers forming “claimed spaces”, in which they join together to develop common 
pursuits.  Most claimed spaces identified by the Study took the form of self-help groups 
centered on income generation activities or emergencies.  These were found especially in 
the case of women, youth and small farmers.  Evidence of this, as uncovered by the Study, 
was found in small “success stories”, which are described as examples in section 8.2.6.   
 
The corollary of the importance of economic empowerment is that the burden of ordinary 
villagers’ struggle to meet basic needs is an important factor standing in the way of their 
broader empowerment.  This is especially true for women, who cite “retrogressive cultural 
beliefs that continue regarding women as inferior figures” (even within their own families) as 
one of the main reasons why they are unable to participate actively in village development. 
These traditional (social) views have a direct economic consequence for women: the 
domestic burdens of women, which are reinforced by these traditional views, limit their ability 
to participate properly in the socio-economic life of their villages and mitaa, either because of 
a lack of time (due to fulfilling household chores) and/or due to social prohibitions. Women’s 
less-than-full participation in socio-economic life, in turn, reinforces their sense of isolation 
and lack of self-confidence when it comes to influencing development in their villages and 
mitaa.   
 
In the in-depth research phase, interviewees indicated that economic obstacles were among 
the most important factors in their difficulties to organize collectively.  These included 
pragmatic considerations, such as poverty and “inadequate access to affordable agricultural 
inputs and micro credit”.  
8.2.4 The Omnipresence of Petty Corruption and Bribery 
 
Recent studies on petty and “grand” corruption have highlighted the problem of its 
prevalence, and of its social, economic and political roots. Thus, a study by Sikika (2010) on 
petty corruption in health services in Tanzania noted that corruption is “rampant” and “difficult 
to solve”, but that people’s perceptions of the extent of corruption does “not correlate with 
their own experiences of being asked for and giving bribes” in that “only a relatively small 
proportion of patients (18 percent) reported having been asked to pay a bribe” (Sikika, 12, 
81). This finding differs from that that of the present Study, which indicated that—in all 
villages and mitaa surveyed—most villagers readily admitted to needing to engage in petty 
corruption and “gift giving” to local leaders and officials in order to get almost anything done, 
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from demanding small favors to circumventing the local bureaucracy and “solving problems”.  
In fact, the incidence and necessity of bribery in village life is so prevalent that respondents 
did not know where to begin (and whom to approach) to complain about it.  
 
The omnipresence of petty corruption points to the complex power dimensions of the 
problem, and the inherent duality of the nature of this power. The acceptance of small bribes 
represents a form of hidden power for village leaders (who extract bribes from their 
constituents) and district officials (who in turn extract them from village leaders).  The inability 
of ordinary people to complain about petty corruption also represents another form of hidden 
power of leaders, in the shape of their impunity and unaccountability. Moreover, leaders’ 
access to bribes and material benefits also gives them symbolic and cultural forms of power 
that, according to the theory of cultural capital of Pierre Bourdieu, resemble “embodied 
capital” and a form of invisible power.   
 
But this Study has noted that the act of being able to give small bribes and gifts also 
represents a form of hidden power possessed by ordinary villagers. Those villagers with 
more money can afford to bribe more and “get more things done”, while poorer villagers 
(often youth and women) complained that they were disadvantaged and “could not be 
successful” because they could not afford to bribe leaders.  
 
8.2.5 Formal and Informal Accountability Structures 
 
The present Study distinguishes between two kinds of accountability mechanisms at the 
village level: formal and informal.  Formal accountability mechanisms revolve primarily 
around the village meeting. In principle, at village meetings, village committees present 
reports to the citizenry regarding leaders’ performance and achievements in the area of local 
development.  Ordinary citizens, members of the political opposition, and representatives of 
civil society are all supposed to be able to make use of the village meeting forum to seek 
information and demand accountability.  Outside of the village meeting structure, another 
formal accountability mechanism is provided by the village notice board.  Leaders are 
expected to communicate to citizens on these notice boards what is being planned at local 
level and how funds have been spent on development programs.  This Study demonstrates 
that the degree to which village meetings and notice boards fulfill their intended role as 
accountability mechanisms in practice varies to a large extent, depending on local 
leadership, pressure from citizens and opposition party members, and other factors. 
 
Informal accountability structures take two main forms.  On the one hand, some local leaders 
have indicated in the present Study that they take the time—outside of the village meeting 
forum, and outside of any other official structures—to assist their constituents, provide them 
with information, listen to their complaints, and persuade them where necessary, regarding 
local development issues and personal matters.  Here again, the degree to which village 
leaders actually fulfill their role as informal accountability structures varies to a large extent, 
depending on local leadership and the determination of citizens to seek them out on an 
informal basis.  On another level, in most of the villages included in this Study, ordinary 
villagers among themselves tend to initiate informal mechanisms to promote and inform each 
other about local development. These may take the form of small associations (such as 
women's groups, self-help groups, and income generation schemes, etc.), informal 
gatherings at “kijiweni” and “vijiweni”, and informal meetings of members of opposition 
parties. In the case of these kinds of informal gatherings, accountability is towards members 
of the group.  
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8.2.6 Some Success Stories 
 
Success stories of inclusive participation and empowerment are still the exception rather 
than the rule in the villages and mitaa covered by the Study.  Nevertheless, there is evidence 
that—in some areas at least, and among some groups of respondents—progress in the 
linked areas of empowerment and decision-making is being made. The main distinguishing 
factors in these “success stories” appear to be good individual leadership and collective 
organization (whether in formal or “informal” structures), mainly centered around income 
generation activities, as explained also in the finding in section 8.2.3.   
 
The following examples from Msorwa, Ilopa and Mjimwema villages appear to demonstrate 
this in the case of traditionally least influential groups at local level, i.e. women, youth and 
small farmers.  In these cases, growing confidence emanates from economic and social 
empowerment, which in turn has led youth and women in these villages to make more 
demands for participation and inclusion in local governance, resulting in positions of 
leadership. Moreover, the success stories indicate that progress towards participation and 
empowerment transcends the urban-rural divide as well as the issue of local government 
performance, as the cases hail from a range of different areas.  Ilopa and Mjimwema are 
both remote rural areas, whereas Msorwa is a suburban village outside Dar es Salaam. And 
while Ilopa village is in the top level of councils in the sample (Kyela council), Mjimwema 
village is located in a medium-performing council (Njombe) and Msorwa is in a poorly 
performing council (Mkuranga).   
 
“Our ability to influence development planning through official forums has 
increased...In the past most of leadership positions were under old people, but 
nowadays the youths are leaders and most youths feel free to give their views. 
There is improvement in youth involvement in village development 
planning…We have the ability to influence development planning…It has 
increased because youth are coming up with new ideas that [are] challenging 
ways of community life, including coming up with new economic activities like 
the fast food business [processing and marketing of cashew nuts]” (FGDs for 
youth and small farmers, Msorwa village, Mukuranga council, Pwani region). 
 
“We are becoming a little bit [more] successful at influencing decisions in 
village development planning, and this is because women nowadays are 
empowered to know their rights and are much more involved in income 
generating projects”….We [also] have the ability to influence development 
planning because the community is becoming more and more aware of the 
contribution of women in development” (FGD for women, Ilopa village, Kyela 
council, Mbeya region). 
 
“Nowadays women are empowered and participating fully in development 
planning and income generating self-help groups. We have microfinance 
[programs] like FINCA and PRIDE, which are very much assisting women in 
income generating projects in this mtaa…Women have become more 
successful at influencing decisions in this village [as] they are empowered with 
civic education and income generating projects. They are also participating in 
political leadership, for instance Honorable Anna Makinda is our Member of 
Parliament and she is a woman” (FGD for women, Mjimwema village, Njombe 
council, Iringa region). 
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9 Recommendations 
The Study proposes three sets of recommendations. The first is a summary of priorities 
advanced by respondents to achieve greater participation in their villages and mitaa. The 
second are the Study Team’s own recommendations on how the LGRP could encourage 
more participation and strengthen mechanisms to demand greater transparency and 
accountability at the local level.  Finally, the Study Team assesses the merits and 
effectiveness of the power cube as a framework for an analysis of power relations, and 
suggests three modifications to the model. 
9.1 Respondents’ Priorities for Reform 
 
When the Study Team asked respondents what they thought would be the most important 
changes that would help to promote greater participation in their villages and mitaa, the two 
most important factors that were cited were 1) greater transparency in decision-making 
regarding local development (which reflects a demand for democratization) and 2) the need 
for citizens to achieve a better understanding of local development and procedures (which 
can be identified as a form of self-empowerment through better information). What these two 
types of responses arguably demonstrate is that many citizens are yearning for greater 
involvement in local development and governance and an end to isolation and 
marginalization.  
9.1.1  “Less Politics” and Greater Accountability to the People 
 
Those who have conducted longitudinal studies point to a gradual change as a result of 
democratization and decentralization policies associated with the LGRP.  K.A. Snyder 
(2008), who conducted research on power and politics in Tanzania in 1990 and again in 
2001/2002, claims to have observed a markedly different tenor between these two periods of 
time, as villagers began using the “rhetoric of demokrasia” to challenge government officials 
openly.   
 
In the present Study, the rhetoric of democracy permeates respondents’ recommendations 
for how to improve participation in their villages and mitaa. Respondents are increasingly 
using the rhetoric of democracy in their analysis and critiques of local-level participation. 
Thus, while many experiences of poor or absent local participation still abound, at least many 
respondents appear to be holding their leaders—and the open forums of participation in their 
villages—up to a higher standard, i.e. one that is characterized by the need for transparency, 
accountability and space for genuine civic inputs in decision-making. In general, respondents 
(including village leaders) demand “less politics” and more accountability from government 
officials, particularly at district level.  
 
“We need to reduce politics in formal collective demands, and leaders should 
make sure that they are accountable to people, especially implementing what 
was decided by village general meeting” (LGD, Ilopa village, Kyela council, 
Mbeya region).  
 
Leaders at district level should have a culture of visiting local communities at 
least once per month to know problems which are facing us” (FGD for local 
business people, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, Kilimanjaro region).  
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“Participation can only be effective if elected leaders can be given [an] 
opportunity to implement people’s wishes and not directives from above... It is 
the District that controls our life here. They have not learned that the country 
wants people to run their [own] life. Or they might be advised wrongly, you 
know Tarime and Rorya are always thought to be bad places, but those are 
lies” (FGD for leaders, Bubombi village, Rorya district, Mara region).  
 
“The district must change and make sure they work for people, not for 
themselves. They must make sure they listen to village and mtaa leaders, 
otherwise more people will hate us leading to what will come as you saw 
Chadema coming to power due to what people see as a sleeping District 
Council” (Interview with leader, Kagera hamlet, Ukerewe district, Mwanza 
region).  
 
“[The] district level needs to be close  to the village level and bridge the gap 
between village and district level, and take appropriate action in case of poor 
village leadership” (FGD for youth, Kichangare mtaa, Mwanga council, 
Kilimanjaro region).  
 
For village and district leaders, the most pressing priority was considered to be “involving 
local people more in village development planning” (60 percent of responses; 18 out of 30 
responses).  A particular priority for village leaders was considered to be improving their 
“commitment to transparency and accountability” (23 percent; 7 out of 30 responses).  
 
Figure 18: What can village leaders do to make participation by villagers more effective? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2) 
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Figure 19: What can the district level do to make participation by villagers more effective? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2) 
 
9.1.2 Better Information and More Transparency in Local Government   
 
The most popular factors that respondents identified as contributing to greater participation 
was more “project education” (22 percent of responses), followed by “transparency and 
accountability” (14 percent of responses), more “loans to develop projects” (12.5 percent), 
and “participatory planning education” (11 percent of responses).   
 
Figure 20: What is the most important factor that would help to promote greater participation in your 
village/mtaa? 
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(% of respondents; Total N = 120; Phase 1) 
 
These results were common to all the respondent categories, albeit with slightly different 
priorities. The two factors most cited by local leaders were “transparency and accountability” 
(25 percent of leaders’ responses), followed by providing “participatory planning education” 
(22 percent of leaders’ responses).   
 
For women interviewees, the two priority factors were “project education” and “good 
leadership” (each 20 percent of women interviewees’ responses).  These were followed by 
“loans to develop projects” and “transparency and accountability” (each at 17 percent of 
responses). “Project education” was the overwhelming priority for youth respondents (43 
percent of youth responses) as well as for casual laborers (3 out of 8 respondents).  The 
main priorities for small farmers were “participatory planning education” and “providing 
estates for youth agriculture” (each at 19 percent of this sub-group’s responses).   
 
Respondents also pointed to a role for themselves in improving the information flow at local 
level. In the in-depth research phase, respondents from the three focal areas of Ilopa village, 
Kichangare hamlet and Kagera mtaa were asked about the role of different levels of 
development (villagers, leaders and district level) in improving participation at local level (see 
next three Figures).  At village level, most individual interviewees felt that their participation in 
official forums (invited spaces) could be made more effective if they identified their priorities 
better (10 out of 30 responses).  
 
 
Figure 21: How can participation by villagers in collective (official) mechanisms be made more 
effective in your village? 
(% of respondents; Total N = 30; Phase 2) 
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9.2 Study Team Recommendations 
 
The Study’s own recommendations address the twin challenges raised in the conclusion of 
the Study (both the familiar conclusions from the literature as well as the “new” findings): how 
can the LGRP encourage more participation and strengthen mechanisms to demand greater 
transparency and accountability at the local level in Tanzania?  
 
The Study Team recommendations complement the proposals of respondents. They are 
indicative only and deliberately vague about the identity of the actors required to fulfill these 
tasks; more detail about precise modalities and institutional roles and responsibilities should 
be worked out more accurately later, within the context of the LGRP.    
9.2.1 Improving Transparency 
 
• Reduce opportunities for corruption and patronage-based politics: The LGRP 
has had a positive impact in allocating greater powers to village-level governments. At 
the same time, this has given greater opportunities for some local elites to capture 
power and abuse it for personal gain. In order to limit the scope for corruption and 
patronage-based politics, the Study Team recommends greater transparency in the 
managing of grants and transfers from higher levels of government to the district and 
village levels. For instance, transfers from national government to district and village 
levels can be made contingent on publication of detailed village finances on a notice 
board outside the VEO’s office in a format that is easy to understand for the villagers 
and identify discrepancies, if any. This should be used in conjunction with national 
legislation on right to information that is enforceable through an independent agency. 
Another recommendation is to create more than one channel through which transfers 
and development aid flows into the village (e.g. through community based 
organizations that can apply for grants) and creating competition among these 
various agents of development. In such a situation the village leaders are only one set 
of actors, but they are not the only ones making decisions. It is also suggested to 
allow for anonymous complaints to be registered either by mail or by phone to a 
regional or national vigilance committee regarding local abuse of power. 
 
• Reduce the scope for partisan politics: Some of the reasons for lack of citizen 
participation at the village or mtaa level have to do with political apathy of the people, 
which results from dominant political parties monopolizing the entire political space, 
with little opposition. And since political parties are organized hierarchically, they are 
not necessarily the best vehicles to organize bottom-up decision making structures 
from village to district level.  Measures can be put in place so that local politics no 
longer remains partisan in nature but is mainly issue-based, where independent 
candidates contest the elections and where elections then become an instrument in 
constructing the local public agenda from the viewpoint of competing local interests. 
(Note that political parties usually sacrifice local development issues and focus 
primarily on representing one or the other competing national interests.) This form of 
representative democracy, together with the use of referenda (which can be seen as 
a form of participatory democracy) would address the current lack of political 
competition. Other ideas can be explored in consultation with national governments, 
for example: giving the opposition candidate a formal role in the village affairs even if 
she/he lost in the election would create some checks and balance on the power of the 
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village leader. But such a change would then have to be institutionalized in the form 
of national legislation and not be left to the discretion of the village leader. 
9.2.2 Strengthening Participation 
 
• Address the cultural barriers to women’s participation: Women’s voices were the 
weakest in most villages that were part of the Study. Affirmative action measures for 
women in local government councils implemented in other countries should be 
examined—i.e. India, where 50 percent of panchayat (village council) seats are 
reserved for women—to see what can be learned from these experiences. In the 
short run, affirmative action measures run the risk of attracting women from 
households that constitute the local elites. It is therefore important that these 
affirmative action regulations be kept in place for a sufficiently long duration of time so 
as to change the cultural perceptions about women in leadership positions. 
 
• Invite people to participate through anonymous channels: The Study indicates 
that, in several villages and mitaa surveyed, ordinary citizens are scared to exercise 
their right to participate meaningfully in public decision-making. Quite a few 
respondents feel intimidated by village leaders and government officials for speaking 
out about their concerns during public meetings. In order to bridge the gap identified 
by the Study between citizens and invited (official) spaces at village level, anonymous 
instruments should be made available, such as secret ballots for village referendums, 
anonymous suggestion boxes, etc. These anonymous instruments, while not ideal in 
the long term to promote an open local democracy, would aim to give citizens—in the 
short to medium term—an outlet for their concerns and complaints, while also giving 
them the feeling that their priorities are being addressed.  At the same time, these 
instruments might help overcome the barrier of fear of “intimidation” by local leaders 
that many respondents indicated exists.  
 
• Increase support for participatory budgeting techniques: In some villages, 
participation was perceived to be more of an obligation than a right, related as it is to 
cash or labor contributions and less as a right to have a voice in public decision-
making. Mechanisms should be increased for participation, without making too many 
demands on people (either in the form of mandatory participation or project 
contributions). This can be done by making available a substantial portion of grants 
and transfers for capital expenses a village receives and mandating it to be spent 
using participatory budgeting techniques. This will help change the perception of 
villagers as well as the village leaders that participation is not merely about 
obligations of villagers towards the state, but also about the rights of villagers to have 
a voice in state spending. In the medium to longer term, local governments should be 
granted powers to levy taxes/user fees that can pay for public works projects 
implemented by the village councils. 
9.3 Strengthening the Power Cube as Framework of Power 
 
This Study has applied the “power cube” as its theoretical framework to analyze the 
character of power in selected villages and mitaa across Tanzania.  The power cube 
provides a very useful conceptual model to assess the level and quality of participation, 
yielding insights across three critical dimensions of power (spaces, forms of power, and 
levels of decision-making).  There is still much work to do to further uncover the dynamics 
inherent in relations of power and decision-making across these three dimensions.  However, 
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further research on power in Tanzania might benefit from continued adaptation of the model.  
Modifications are suggested in three areas.  
 
• Addressing linkages across power cube dimensions at multiple levels: Findings of the 
present Study were organized carefully according to the three dimensions of the 
power cube, to adhere closely to the model.  However, in practice, the three 
dimensions are inter-linked: visible, hidden and invisible forms of power traverse all 
three spaces of participation, across multiple levels of decision-making. The various 
inter-dimensional linkages are multiple, and complex.  Further research on power in 
Tanzania might usefully illustrate these linkages across multiple levels of decision-
making (not just at village level) and for different sets of actors.  
 
• Adding new dimensions of power and participation: Two of the main findings of the 
Study (on the one hand, the omnipresence of bribery and corruption at local level, 
and on the other hand, the importance of economic empowerment as a pre-requisite 
for social and political empowerment (or at least, as a simultaneous development 
alongside social and political empowerment) fit uneasily within the existing 
dimensions of the power cube.  These findings are multi-dimensional, but in addition, 
they point to the need to consider new categories of power, possibly related to 
“shadow power” (related to the way things “actually work”) and to livelihoods and 
resources, both of which are not yet provided for explicitly in the power cube 
framework.  In the context of the latter, the focus of Naila Kabeer (1999) on 
“resources” as one of the three main dimensions of people’s ability to make choices 
(and thus achieve power) might be a useful model for the power cube (see also 
section 5.4.3).  . 
 
• Juxtaposition of other models of power: The power cube is an excellent tool to 
“assess the ways in which power works” (Gaventa 2005, 10).  Alongside this tool, it 
might be useful for further research on power in Tanzania to address also the 
question of what power looks like once it is produced (in any form: visible, hidden or 
invisible). In this context, the power cube could be usefully combined with other 
models of power that expose “hierarchies” (levels of intensity) of different types of 
power achieved.  Two such models (among others) include those of Anne Marie 
Goetz and Shireen Hassim (2003) and Lisa Veneklasen and Valerie Miller (2002).  
 
o Goetz and Hassim make a distinction between “access”, “presence” and 
“influence” in participation, which represent steps of participation. The first 
step, “access”, involves opening arenas for socially excluded groups for 
dialogue and information sharing.  The second step, “presence”, involves 
institutionalizing participation in decision-making, while the third step, 
“influence”, brings excluded groups’ engagement with politics, civil society and 
the state to a higher level, where these groups can “translate access and 
presence into a tangible impact on policy making, the operation of the legal 
system, and the organization of service delivery” (Goetz and Hassim, 39-40).  
The framework of Goetz and Hassim has at least two important lessons in the 
case of the present Study.  First, opportunities for excluded groups to be 
consulted (through “access” and “presence”, for example in village meetings) 
do not lead, on their own, to policy influence.  And second, opportunities to be 
represented in political forums or in the local administration (for example, in 
the case of village leaders or women councilors) do not automatically translate 
into actual influence and power.   
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o Veneklasen and Miller, as well as Rosalind Eyben (2004) and others, make a 
distinction between several kinds of expressions of power, including notably 
“power to”, “power with” and “power within”.  “Power to” is defined as “the 
capacity to have an effect” or simply also as “agency” (defined as intention or 
consciousness of action). “Power with” is related to collective action, or 
“common ground among different interests and building collective strength 
through organization and the development of shared values and strategies”. 
“Power within” is the power of self-worth and sense of dignity that results from 
the power to organize with others (Eyben, 2-8). In their self-development 
initiatives, respondents in the present Study displayed a sense of “power to” 
(in individual actions) and “power within” (in informal group activities).  
However, the achievement of collective strength in the form of “power with” is 
(in most cases) elusive. 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Focus Group Discussions, Phase 1 
 
QUESTIONS FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS (PHASE 1) 
Revised 29-Sep-2010 
 
 
Background information: 
 
Date and time:   
Name of note taker:  
Name of facilitator:  
Team number: Team 1  Team 2  Team 3  
 
Select that which applies: Village  Mtaa   
Name of Village/Mtaa:  
Name of Council: District  Municipality  City  
Name of Region:  
 
Select that which applies: FGD for Leaders   
FGD for Women  
FGD for Youth  
FGD for Small Farmers  
FGD for Casual Laborers  
Number of respondents: Total Male Female 
 
 
Note on question numbering: Questions added by SIDA during comments on initial inception 
report have been numbered as “Extra” questions 1, 2, 3 etc., in order to enable continuation 
of data analysis of the original questions using the original question numbers, and to prevent 
confusion.  
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Introduction 
1 Mnadhani ni miradi gani ya maendeleo 
kama miwili au mitatu ambayo ni ya 
muhimu sana katika kipindi cha miaka 
mitano iliyopita kwenye kijiji/mtaa 
wenu? 
 
What do you consider to be the 2 or 3 most important 
development projects in your village during the past 5 
years? List here.  
 
Maelekezo kwa wadodoswaji: Katika 
majadiliano yetu tutatawauliza maswali 
ambayo yanahusu kushiriki kwenu 
katika kupanga mipango ya maendeleo. 
Wakati mkitoa majibu, tafadhali tumia 
mifano kutoka katika miradi hiyo miwili 
au mitatu ya kijijini/mtaani kwenu.  
 
Instructions for Respondents: In this discussion, we 
will ask you a number of questions about your 
participation in development planning in your 
village/mtaa. Please refer your answers to the 2 or 3 
projects that you mention here.  
 
Taja: 
 
1. Project 1:  
 
2. Project 2: 
 
3. Project 3: 
 
Category 1.1: Spaces of Participation 
2 Nani anatoa maamuzi ya mipango ya maendeleo katika kijiji/mtaa wenu? 
Who makes decisions related to development planning in your village/mtaa? 
 
3 Katika kipindi cha miaka 5 iliyopita, kuna mabadiliko yoyote kuhusu njia 
zinazotumika kutoa maamuzi ya mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji 
chako/mtaa?  
Has the way in which decisions related to development planning are made in your village/mtaa 
changed during the past 5 years? Please explain.   
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question asks about all kinds of decision-making 
forums—informal and formal] 
 
4 Unadhani ushawishi wako/wenu katika utoaji wa maamuzi umeongezeka au 
umepungua katika miaka 5 iliyopita, au hakuna mabadiliko? Tafadhali 
elezea.  
Do you feel that you have become more or less successful at influencing decisions in your 
village/mtaa related to development planning during the past 5 years—or has it stayed the same?    
 
5 Kama ushawishi wako umekuwa na mafanikio kidogo au umebaki 
hivyohivyo, nini hasa kinachokwamisha?  
If you have become more successful, then why is this the case? If you have been less successful—or 
there has been no change—what have been the obstacles? 
 
Category 2.1: Visible Forms of Power 
6 Jee unafikiri una uwezo wa kushawishi mipango ya Maendeleo kwa kupitia 
vikao rasmi?  
Do you think you have the ability to influence development planning through official forums? Please 
explain.  
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7 Katika miaka 5 iliyopita, uwezo wako wa kushawishi mipango ya 
maendeleo, kupitia vikao rasmi, umezidi au umepungua, au hakuna 
mabadiliko? Umeongezeka; Umepungua; umebaki kama ulivyo; Sijui.  
Has your ability to influence development planning through official forums increased or decreased 
during the past 5 years, or has it stayed the same?  Please explain.  
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question asks about only official decision-making forums, such as 
village meetings] 
 
8 Kama umeongezeka ni kwasababu gani?  Kama umepungua, ni kwasababu 
gani? 
If it has increased, why do you think this is the case? If it has decreased, why do you think this is the 
case?  
 
Extra 
1 
Je, mipango ya maendeleo kwenye kijiji/mtaa wenu inafuatwa? Kuna 
wanaofuatilia? 
Are plans for development projects followed? Are they followed up?  
 
Extra 
2 
Ni habari gani ambazo watu wa kijijini/mtaani hapa wanazipata ili kuweza 
kushiriki na kufuatilia mipango ya maendeleo? 
 
Which information do people receive that enables them to participate and follow up? 
 
Extra 
3 
Ni vyama vingapi vya kisiasa vilivyo katika kijiji hiki? 
 
How many political parties are present in this village/mtaa?  
 
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question can be observed if too sensitive to ask] 
 
Extra 
4 
Je, watu katika kijiji/mtaa wako wamewahi kuomba kushiriki katika 
maendeleo? Kama ndiyo, walijibiwaje? 
 
Have people in your village/mtaa ever demanded to participate in development? If Yes, what was the 
response?  Select: Yes, no, I do not know. Explain. 
 
 
Category 2.2: Hidden Forms of Power 
9 Ili matakwa/maoni yenu yasikilizwe, ni njia gani mbadala, ambazo si rasmi, 
unazotumia/mnazotumia nje ya vikao rasmi? Toa mifano.  
What are the main unofficial/informal ways, outside of official forums, which you have available to 
make your views heard?  Give examples. 
 
10 Kwanini mnahitaji vikao ambavyo si rasmi?  
What are the reasons why you need these informal forums? 
 
Category 2.3: Invisible Forms of Power 
11 Jee viongozi wanafaidika zaidi katika jamii ukilinganisha na watu wengine? 
Kama ndio, ni kwasababu gani? Elezea jinsi wanavyofaidika/mnavyofaidika. 
Are leaders more advantaged in society compared to other people?  If yes, why? How do you explain 
their/your advantaged position? 
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12 Jee wanawake, vijana, vibarua, wakulima wadogo 
wamesahaulika/hawafaidiki sana katika jamii? Kama ndio, ni kwanini? 
Elezea jinsi wasivyofaidika 
 
Are [women/youth/casual laborers/small farmers] more disadvantaged in society?  If yes, why? How 
do you explain their/your disadvantaged position? 
 
Extra 
5 
Je, waganga wa kienyeji na viongozo wa kidni wana ushawishi katika 
kijiji/mtaa huu? Kama ndiyo, kivipi? Kama hapana, kwa nini? 
 
Are traditional leaders and religious leaders influential? If Yes, how so? If No, why not? 
 
 
Extra 
6 
Ni kitu gani kinachompa mtu ushawishi zaidi: pesa au ardhi? 
 
Which factor gives a person more influence: money or land? 
 
 
Category 3.1: Levels of Decision-Making 
13 Mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji changu/mtaa inashawishiwa zaidi na 
maamuzi kutoka katika ngazi zifuatazo: Kimataifa, taifa, au ngazi za chini 
(Chagua ngazi moja) 
 
Development planning in my village/mtaa is most influenced by decisions at what level?  Supra-
national, national, or local level?  (Select only one level) 
 
14 Ushawishi kutoka kwa nani hasa? Tafadhali elezea. 
 
The biggest influence comes specifically from who or what? Explain the reasons for your answer. 
 
Conclusion 
15 Kwa watu kama nyie, mnadhani ni mambo gani muhimu ambayo yataweza 
kusaidia kuongeza ushiriki mkubwa zaidi katika kijiji/mtaa wenu?  
 
What is the most important factor that you think would help to promote greater participation in 
development planning among people such as yourselves in your village?  Mention only one factor. 
 
 
16 Kwa watu kama nyies, mnafikiri ni vikwazo gani vinavyokwamisha ushiriki 
wenu mkubwa katika kijiji/mtaa wenu?  Revise translation. 
 
What do you think is the most important obstacle to greater participation in development planning 
among people such as yourselves in your village? Mention only one obstacle.  
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire for Individual Interviews, Phase 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS (PHASE 1) 
Revised 29-Sep-2010 
 
 
Background information: 
 
Date and time:   
Name of interviewer:  
Team number: Team 1  Team 2  Team 3  
 
Select that which applies: Village  Mtaa  
Name of Village/Mtaa:  
Name of Council: District  Municipality  City  
Name of Region:  
 
Interview category of respondent: 
Leader   
Type of Leader: Village  Religious  Civil society 
 
Other  Mention: 
____________________________ 
Select that which applies: 
Woman  
Youth  
Small Farmer  
Casual Laborer  
 
 
Note on question numbering: Questions added by SIDA during comments on initial inception 
report have been numbered as “Extra” questions A, B, C etc., in order to enable continuation 
of data analysis of the original questions using the original question numbers, and to prevent 
confusion.   
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Introduction 
1 Unadhani ni miradi gani ya maendeleo 
kama miwili au mitatu ambayo ni ya 
muhimu sana katika kipindi cha miaka 
mitano iliyopita kwenye kijiji/mtaa 
wenu? 
 
What do you consider to be the 2 or 3 most 
important development projects in your village 
during the past 5 years? List here.  
 
Maelekezo kwa mdodoswaji: Katika 
majadiliano yetu tutatakuuliza maswali 
ambayo yanahusu kushiriki kwako 
katika kupanga mipango ya 
maendeleo. Wakati ukitoa majibu, 
tafadhali tumia mifano kutoka katika 
miradi hiyo miwili au mitatu ya 
kijijini/mtaani kwanu.  
 
Instructions for Respondents: In this interview, we 
will ask you a number of questions about your 
participation in development planning in your 
village/mtaa. Please refer your answers to the 2 or 3 
projects that you mention here.  
 
Taja: 
 
4. Project 1:  
 
5. Project 2: 
 
6. Project 3: 
 
Category 1.1: Spaces of Participation 
2 
(same 
as FGD 
Q1) 
Nani anatoa maamuzi ya mipango ya 
maendeleo katika kijiji/mtaa wenu? 
 
Who makes decisions related to development 
planning in your village/mtaa? 
 
Elezea: 
Ndio  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
3 Kwa miaka 5 iliyopita, umewahi 
kushiriki katika  vikao vyovyote vya 
kutoa maamuzi kuhusu mipango ya 
Maendeleo? 
 
Have you participated in any decision-making 
activities in your village or mtaa during the past 5 
years related to development planning? MC: Select: 
Yes; No; Don't know; No answer. 
 
 
4 Kama ndio, ni vikao gani?  
Kama hapana, ni kwasababu gani? 
 
If Yes, what kind of forums were these?   
If No, why not? 
 
Elezea: 
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Unaweza kuchagua zaidi ya jibu moja  
Kuhudhuria tu  
Kutoa taarifa  
Kutoa mapendekezo  
Kuchangia vitu/fedha  
Kuunda makundi kufikia lengo  
Kushiriki kwa kujumuika na wengine 
(kutoa uchambuzi yakinifu wa pamoja) 
 
Hakuna jibu  
5 Kama ndio, ulishiriki vipi? (ushiriki 
wako ulikuwaje?).  
 
If Yes, how did you participate? Multiple responses, 
from passive to active; Select from: attendance 
only; information giving; consultation only; providing 
resources; by forming groups to meet objectives; 
interactive participation (joint analysis); self-
mobilization (taking own initiative) (Pretty, 1996). 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
 
 
 
Ndio  
Kwa kiasi fulani  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
6 Jee katika vikao hivi, unahisi 
umeweza kushawishi maamuzi 
kuhusu mipango ya Maendeleo?  
 
Do you feel that you were able to influence 
decisions about development planning in your 
village/mtaa through these forums? Select: Yes; 
Partially; No; Don’t Know; No answer 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
7 
(same 
as FGD 
Q2) 
Katika kipindi cha miaka 5 iliyopita, 
kuna mabadiliko yoyote kuhusu njia 
zinazotumika kutoa maamuzi ya 
mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji 
chako/mtaa?  
Has the way in which decisions related to 
development planning are made in your 
village/mtaa changed during the past 5 years? 
Please explain. 
 
Elezea: 
Ndio  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
8 Unahisi kuna vikao vyovyote katika 
kijiji chako/mtaa ambavyo hualikwi 
kuhudhuria au kushiriki? Ndio; 
Hapana; Hakuna jibu.  
 
Do you feel that there are any forums in your village 
or mtaa where you are not invited to attend or 
participate? Select: Yes; No; Don’t know; No 
answer.  
 
 
9 Kama ndio, ni vikao gani? 
 
If Yes, what kind of forums? 
 
Taja: 
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Ndio  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
10 Kuna vikao vyovyote vya mipango ya 
maendeleo, ambavyo hupangwa na 
wanavijiji bila kusubiri serikali? 
 
Are there any development planning  forums being 
organized by villagers without waiting for the 
government? Select: Yes, no, I do not know. 
Explain. 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Ndio  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
Extra 
A 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Extra 
4) 
Je, watu katika kijiji/mtaa wako 
wamewahi kuomba kushiriki katika 
maendeleo? Kama ndiyo, walijibiwaje? 
 
Have people in your village/mtaa ever demanded to 
participate in development? If Yes, what was the 
response?  Select: Yes, no, I do not know. Explain. 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Category 2.1: Visible Forms of Power 
11 Katika vikao rasmi, watu wa 
pembezoni, kama nyie (yaani kwa 
mfano, wazee, watoto, walemavu, nk. ) 
mnakabiliwa na vikwazo gani, pale 
mnapotaka kushawishi utoaji wa 
maamuzi, kuuliza maswali, na 
mnapohoji uwazi na uwajibikaji?  
 
What are the main obstacles that people such as 
yourselves (i.e., women, youth, small farmers, 
casual laborers, the poor, etc.) face in official forums 
when they try to influence decision-making, raise 
questions and demand accountability and 
transparency?  
 
Taja: 
Zaidi  
Pungufu  
Hamna mabadiliko  
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
12 Je, vikwazo hivi vimezidi au 
vimepungua katika miaka 5 iliyopita? 
Tafadhali elezea. 
 
Have these obstacles become more or less during 
the past 5 years? Please explain. 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Mkutano wa kijiji  
Mkutano wa kisiasa  
Mkutano wa NGOs  
13 Ni vikao gani rasmi ambavyo ni 
muhimu kwa watu walio pembezoni 
kama nyie ili kuweza kusikilizwa, 
kushawishi maamuzi, kuuliza maswali, 
na kuhoji uwazi na uwajibikaji?  Mingineo  
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Which official forums are the most important for  
people such as yourselves to be heard, to influence 
decision-making, to raise questions and to demand 
accountability and transparency? Select from: 
village meetings; meetings with politicians; meetings 
with NGOs; Other. 
 
Toa jibu moja: 
14 Kwanini vikao hivi ni muhimu? 
 
Why are these forums the most important? 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
15 Ni makundi gani ya watu ambao 
huhodhi hivi vikao rasmi? Tafadhali 
ainisha  
 
Which groups of people dominate discussions in 
these official forums?  
 
 
Taja: 
16 Wanahodhi kwa namna gani? 
Tafadhali eleza  
 
How do they dominate? 
 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
Umefanikiwa sana  
Umefanikiwa kiasi  
Sikufanikiwa   
Sikufanikiwa kabisa  
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
17 Kwa kiasi gani watu walio pembezoni 
kama nyie mmefanikiwa kushawishi 
utoaji wa maamuzi katika vikao rasmi? 
Tafadhali eleza (Kiasi kidogo, kiasi 
kikubwa, hawajafanikiwa kabisa). 
Revise translation. 
 
How successful are people such as yourselves in 
influencing decision-making in official forums?  
Select: Very successful; somewhat successful; 
somewhat unsuccessful; not successful at all; Don’t 
know; No answer. 
 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Ndio  
Kwa kiasi fulani  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
18 Kwa miaka mitano iliyopita, unadhani 
wanawake wamepata ushawishi 
mkubwa zaidi katika masuala ya 
mipango ya maendeleo?  
 
Do you think that women have gained more 
influence in development planning during the past 5 
years?  Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don’t Know; No 
answer. 
 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Ndio  
Kwa kiasi fulani  
Hapana   
Sijui  
19 Unafikiri wanaume wamepoteza nguvu 
za ushawishi juu ya mipango ya 
maendeleo kwa miaka 5 iliyopita? 
Ndio; Hapana, Sijui.  
 
Do you think that men have lost influence in Hakuna jibu   
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development planning during the past 5 years?  
Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don’t Know; No answer. 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Ndio  
Kwa kiasi fulani  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
Extra 
B 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Extra 
1) 
Je, mipango ya maendeleo kwenye 
kijiji/mtaa wenu inafuatwa? Kuna 
wanaofuatilia? 
Are plans for development projects followed? Are 
they followed up? Select: Yes; Partially; No; Don’t 
Know; No answer. 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Extra 
C 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Extra 
2) 
Ni habari gani ambazo watu wa 
kijijini/mtaani hapa wanazipata ili 
kuweza kushiriki na kufuatilia mipango 
ya maendeleo? 
 
Which information do people receive that enables 
them to participate and follow up? 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
Extra 
D 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Extra 
3) 
Ni vyama vingapi vya kisiasa vilivyo 
katika kijiji hiki? 
 
How many political parties are present in this 
village/mtaa?  
 
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: This question can be 
observed if too sensitive to ask] 
 
Taja: 
Category 2.2: Hidden Forms of Power/Disempowerment 
20 
(same 
as FGD 
Q8) 
Ili matakwa/maoni yako yasikilizwe, ni 
njia gani mbadala, ambayo si rasmi, 
unayotumia nje ya vikao rasmi? Toa 
mifano.  
What are the main unofficial/informal ways, outside 
of official forums, which you have available to make 
your views heard?  Give examples. 
Taja: 
21 
(same 
as FGD 
Q9) 
Kwa nini unahitaji vikao ambavyo si 
rasmi?  
What are the reasons why you need these informal 
forums? 
Elezea: 
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22 Ni nani unayemfikia kwa urahisi pale 
mnapohitaji msaada katika jambo 
lolote? Tafadhali ainisha. 
 
Who do you turn to first when you need help in any 
matter? List options. 
 
Taja: 
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Category 2.3: Invisible Forms of Power/Disempowerment 
Ndio  
Kwa kiasi fulani  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
23 Kwa mtazamo wako, unadhani una 
mamlaka ya kuendesha maisha yako 
(kwa ujumla)? Ndio; Hapana; 
Inategemea; Sina uhakika  
 
Do you think you have influence over what happens 
to you in your life (in general)? Select: Yes; 
Partially; No; Don’t Know; No answer.  
 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
24 Katika mazingira ya pi? 
 
Under what circumstances Yes/No? 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
25 Tafadhali eleza ni kwasababu gani? 
 
What is the reason for your answer? Open 
question. 
 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
Extra 
E 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Extra 
5) 
Je, waganga wa kienyeji na viongozo 
wa kidni wana ushawishi katika 
kijiji/mtaa huu? Kama ndiyo, kivipi? 
Kama hapana, kwa nini? 
 
Are traditional leaders and religious leaders 
influential? If Yes, how so? If No, why not? 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
Pesa  
Ardhi  
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
Extra 
F 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Extra 
6) 
Ni kitu gani kinachompa mtu 
ushawishi zaidi: pesa au ardhi? 
 
Which factor gives a person more influence: money 
or land? Select: Money; Land; Don’t Know; No 
answer. 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Category 3.1: Levels of Decision-Making 
Benki ya Dunia  
Taasisi za kimataifa  
Nchi nyengine  
Vyama vya siasa  
Asasi zisizokuwa za Serikali  
Viongozi wa dini  
Uongozi wa vijiji  
Sekta binafsi  
26 Ni miundo ipi ambayo ina ushawishi 
mkubwa katika mipango ya maendeleo 
katika kijiji chako? Chagua kati ya 
miundo/taasisi:  
 
Which of these structures has the most influence on 
development planning in your village? Choose from: 
IMF/World Bank; other international organizations; 
other countries; national government; political 
parties; NGOs/CBOs; religious leaders; village 
leadership; private sector; or other (mention specific 
structure). 
 
Yenginezo  
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Tafadhali ainisha muundo maalum: 
 
 
 
27 Toa sababu ya majibu yako  
 
What is the reason for your answer? 
 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
Benki ya Dunia  
Taasisi za kimataifa  
Nchi nyengine  
Vyama vya siasa  
Asasi zisizokuwa za Serikali  
Viongozi wa dini  
Uongozi wa vijiji  
Sekta binafsi  
Yenginezo  
28 Kwa miundo/taasisi ambayo 
imeainishwa, ni upi ambao una 
ushawishi mkubwa zaidi katika utoaji 
wa maamuzi, katika kipindi cha miaka 
5 iliyopita? Tafadhali taja muundo 
husika. 
 
In case of the structures mentioned, whose influence 
is increasing the most within the past 5 years?  
Mention specific structure. 
 
 
Tafadhali ainisha muundo maalum: 
 
 
 
29 Ni kwasababu gani? 
 
What is the reason for your answer? 
 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
Ndio  
Kwa kiasi fulani  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
30 Je, umewahi kusikia sera ya serikali ya 
“madaraka mikoani” au D by D?  
 
Have you heard of the Government’s 
“Decentralization by Devolution” policy? Select: Yes; 
Partially; No; Don’t Know; No answer.  
 
 Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
Ndio  
Kwa kiasi fulani  
Hapana   
Sijui  
Hakuna jibu   
31 Kama ndio, unafikiri sera hii imeweza 
kuongeza ushiriki  wa wanavijiji 
Tanzania? 
 
If Yes, has the “Decentralization by Devolution” 
policy in Tanzania resulted in an increase in 
participation by villagers? Select: Yes; Partially; No; 
Don’t Know; No answer. 
 
 
Toa maelezo (kama ya nahitajika): 
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32 Kama hapana, ni kwasababu gani? 
 
If No, what is the reason for your answer?  
 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
 Ni kwa vipi mahusiano ya kaya 
yanaathiri ushiriki katika maendeleo? 
Je, inawezekana kwamba watu 
mbalimbali wa kwenye kaya moja 
wahudurie mkutano na watoe maoni 
tofauti? 
 
How do intra-household relations influence 
participation? Can several persons of a family attend 
a meeting and can they express differing views? 
 
Elezea: 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
33 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Q14) 
Ni mambo gani muhimu ambayo 
unadhani yataweza kusaidia kuongeza 
ushiriki mkubwa zaidi katika kijiji 
chako kwa watu kama nyie? 
 
What is the most important factor that you think 
would help to promote greater participation in 
development planning among people such as 
yourselves in your village?  Mention only one factor. 
 
Elezea: 
34 
(same 
as 
FGD 
Q15) 
Unafikiri ni vikwazo gani 
vinavyokwamisha ushiriki mkubwa 
katika kijiji/mtaa wako kwa watu kama 
nyie?  Revise translation. 
 
What do you think is the most important obstacle to 
greater participation in development planning among 
people such as yourselves in your village? Mention 
only one obstacle.  
 
Elezea: 
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Appendix 3: Questions for Large Group Discussions, Phase 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR LARGE GROUP DISCUSSION (PHASE 1) 
Revised 29-Sep-2010 
 
 
Background information: 
 
Date and time:   
Name of interviewer:  
Team number: Team 1  Team 2  Team 3  
 
Select that which applies: Village  Mtaa  
Name of Village/Mtaa:  
Name of Council: District  Municipality  City  
Name of Region:  
Number of respondents: Total Male Female 
 
   
Introduction 
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1 Katika kijiji/mtaa huu, watu wengi walidhani 
kwamba miradi muhimu katika miaka mitano 
iliyopita ilikuwa ifuatayo (Wawezeshaji: jaza 
kulingana na FGDs na individual intervews) 
 
In this village, the majority of respondents thought that the 
most important development projects during the past 5 years 
were the following [Facilitators to fill in based on 
discussions in FGDs and individual interviews].  
 
Maelekezo kwa wadodoswaji: Katika 
majadiliano haya, tutafanya ufupisho wa 
mawazo yenu kuhsu kushiriki kwenu katika 
mipango ya maendeleo kwenye kijiji/mtaa 
wenu. Majibu yenu yanahusiana na mipango 
yenu ya maendeleo ambayo mmeitaja hapa.  
 
Instructions for Respondents: In this discussion, we will 
summarize your views about your participation in 
development planning in this village/mtaa. Your answers 
were related to the 2 or 3 projects that you mention here.  
 
Taja: 
 
7. Project 1:  
 
8. Project 2: 
 
9. Project 3: 
 
Category 1.1: Spaces of Participation 
1 Mlisema kwamba katika kijiji/mtaa huu 
maamuzi kuhusu mipango ya maendeleo 
kimsimgi yanafanywa na …………………… 
(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi hiyo kulingana na 
majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual 
interviews). 
 
You mentioned that in this village/mtaa the decisions 
about development plans are made primarily by… 
[Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs 
and individual interviews]. To what extent is this true?  
 
Elezea 
Category 2.1: Visible Forms of Power 
 Uwezo wenu wa kushawishi mipango ya 
maendeleo kupitia vikao rasmi …….. 
(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati 
ya “umeongezeka/kupungua” kulingana na 
majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual 
interviews). Je, ni kweli ? 
Is it true that your ability to influence development 
planning through official forums has 
increased/decreased? [Facilitators to fill in based on 
discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]. 
Elezea 
 
Category 2.2: Hidden Forms of Power 
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 Ili matakwa/maoni yenu yasikilizwe, mlisema 
kwamba kijiji hiki/mtaa huu unatumia … (taja 
njia) kama njia mbadala nje ya vikao rasmi ili 
kushiriki katika mipango ya maendeleo. Je, ni 
kweli? (wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kulingana na 
majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual 
interviews). 
In order to make your views heard, you mentioned that 
you use the following kinds of strategies… [Facilitators 
to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual 
interviews]. To what extent is this true? 
Elezea 
Category 2.3: Invisible Forms of Power 
 Katika kijiji hiki/mtaa huu, viongozi …… 
(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati 
ya “wanafaidika zaidi/hawafaidiki katika jamii 
ukilinganisha na watu wengine” kulingana na 
majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual 
interviews). Je, ni kweli? 
In this village/mtaa, you mentioned that leaders are 
more advantaged/not advantaged in society compared 
to other people [Facilitators to fill in based on 
discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]. To what 
extent is this true? 
Elezea: 
 Watu wa pembezoni kama wanawake, vijana, 
vibarua, wakulima wadogo …… (wawezeshaji: 
jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati ya 
“hawajasahaulika/wamsahaulika katika jamii” 
kulingana na majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na 
individual interviews). Je, ni kweli? 
In this village/mtaa, you mentioned that people such as 
women, youths, casual laborers, small farmers are 
more disadvantaged/not disadvantaged in society 
[Facilitators to fill in based on discussions in FGDs and 
individual interviews]. To what extent is this true? 
Elezea: 
Category 3.1: Levels of Decision-Making 
 Mipango ya Maendeleo katika kijiji 
chenu/mtaa wenu inashawishiwa zaidi na 
maamuzi kutoka katika ngazi za …….. 
(wawezeshaji: jaza nafasi kwa kuchagua kati 
ya ngazi za “kimataifa/kitaifa/ngazi za chini. 
“umeongezeka/kupungua” kulingana na 
majadiliano ya kwenye FGDs na individual 
interviews). Je, ni kweli?. 
Development planning in this village/mtaa is most 
influenced by decisions at the supra-national/ 
national/local level [Facilitators to fill in based on 
discussions in FGDs and individual interviews]. To 
what extent is this true? 
Elezea: 
 
Conclusion 
 Power  ana lys is ,  Tanzan ia   
 
  
 
 
 
95 
 
15 Mlitaja kwamba suala ambalo lingesaidia 
ushiriki mkubwa katika mipango ya 
maendeleo kwa watu kama nyie katika 
kijiji/mtaa wenu ni ……... (Wawezeshaji, jaza 
nafasi hiyo kulingana na mawazo ya FGDs na 
individual interviews). Je, ni kweli? 
 
You mentioned that the most important factor that would 
promote greater participation in development planning 
among people such as yourselves in your village is the 
following… [Facilitators to fill in based on discussions 
in FGDs and individual interviews]? To what extent is 
this true? 
 
 
16 Mlitaja kwamba kikwazo kikubwa katika 
kushiriki katika mipango ya maendeleo 
katika kijiji/mtaa huu ni …… (Wawezeshaji, 
jaza nafasi hiyo kulingana na mawazo ya 
FGDs na individual interviews). Je, ni kweli? 
 
You mentioned that the most important obstacle to greater 
participation in development planning among people such as 
yourselves in your village is the following… [Facilitators to 
fill in based on discussions in FGDs and individual 
interviews]? To what extent is this true? 
 
 
 
Note: Responses to “extra” questions added by SIDA during review of the original inception 
report (see questionnaires for FGDs and individual interviews) will also be reviewed and 
discussed in the LGDs.  These responses will be added to the questions listed here.  
Appendix 4: Questionnaire for All Survey Instruments, Phase 2 
PHASE 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ALL SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
(FGDs/ INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS/LGDs) 
12-Nov-2010 
 
 
Background information: 
 
Date and time:   
Name of note taker:  
Name of facilitator:  
Team number: Team 1  Team 2  Team 3  
 
Select that which applies: Village  Mtaa   
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Name of Village/Mtaa:  
Name of Council: District  Municipality  City  
Name of Region:  
 
Survey technique: FGD  Indiv. Interview  LGD  
In case of FGD and 
INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEW: 
Select the category of 
respondent(s): 
Leader(s)   
Local Business People/Person  
Women/Woman  
Youth  
Small Farmer(s)  
Casual Laborer(s)   
In case of FGD and LGD: 
Number of respondents: 
Total Male Female 
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QUESTIONNAIRE PART 1: ANECDOTAL INFORMATION 
 
Part 1 of the Phase 2 questionnaire asks respondents to provide anecdotal information to 
further detail their experiences with participation and power relations at the local level as 
recorded in Phase 1 of the research.    
 
COLLECTIVE ATTEMPTS TO DEMAND & INFLUENCE DECISION-MAKING 
1-1 What are the most important development priorities in your village? 
 
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: Refer to the priorities mentioned in 1-1 when asking the 
questions below]. 
 
 
We would like to ask you to describe in detail any attempt (whether success or failure) you 
have made within the last 5 years to collectively (i.e., as a group, with other villagers) make a 
demand or influence decision-making through the official channels in your village/mtaa.  
 
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: In case respondents have made a demand or participated in decision-making within 
the past 5 years, then ask questions 1-3 TO 1-9 below]. 
 
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: In case respondents have not made a demand or participated in decision-making 
within the past 5 years, then ask only question 1-2 below].  
 
1-2 If you have not made any collective demand or any attempt to influence 
local decision making within the past 5 years, then why not? 
 
 
Answer the following questions if you have made any attempt(s) to collectively demand or 
participate in decision making within the past 5 years using official channels.   
 
[NOTE TO FACILITATORS: Ask the following questions separately for each attempt, i.e. Attempt # 1, Attempt # 
2, etc.] 
 
1-3 What was the objective of your collective attempt to demand or influence 
decision making at local level? What were you trying to achieve? 
 
 
1-4 Who initiated the attempt? And who joined the attempt? 
 
 
1-5 What was the official channel or mechanism that you used in your 
attempt to demand or influence decision making at local level?  
 
 
1-6 Which local authorities did you approach (i.e. village, district authorities 
and/or other local institutions)?  
 
 
1-7 What was the response from local authorities? 
 
 
1-8 Do you think that your collective demand or participation was 
successful? Why or why not?    
 
 
1-9 What do you consider to be the lessons from these collective attempts? 
 
 
1-10 Do villagers in this village/mtaa currently organize themselves 
collectively in informal (i.e., unofficial) structures to get the services and 
resources that they need?  If yes, which structures do they use? 
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INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES (“SELF-DEVELOPMENT”) 
1-11 What do you think is the best way to get the services and resources that 
you need in your village/mtaa: through your individual efforts (i.e. on your 
own or as a household) or through collective demands, together with 
other villagers?  Or does it depend on the situation? Please explain.  
 
 
1-12 When you use your individual efforts to get what you need, which 
strategies do you currently use?  List a number of formal and informal 
options (petitions, bribes, contacts, etc.). 
 
 
1-13 When you use your individual efforts to get what you need, which 
strategies are the most effective?  Explain why. 
 
 
1-14 Have your strategies for individual efforts changed at all during the past 
5 years? Why or why not? 
 
 
 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS—ORGANIZATION  
1-15 If villagers got together and organized themselves better (whether in 
formal or informal structures), would they be better able to get the 
services and resources that they need? Why or why not?   
 
 
1-16 What are the main obstacles to better organization by villagers (whether 
in formal or informal structures) in your village?   
 
 
1-17 Are these obstacles the same as before, or have you seen a change 
during the past 5 years?  
 
 
 
 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS—PARTICIPATION IN OFFICIAL STRUCTURES 
1-18 How can participation by villagers in collective (official) mechanisms to 
solve development priorities be made more effective in your village?  
 
 
1-19 What can village leaders do to make participation by villagers more 
effective? 
  
 
1-20 What can the district level do to make participation by villagers more 
effective? 
 
 
1-21 Which other institutions should be involved, and what should they do? 
(For example: political parties, civil society, businesses, etc.) 
 
 
1-22 What can villagers do as a group (together) to make participation by 
villagers more effective? 
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1-23 What can you do (individually or as a household) to make participation 
by villagers more effective?  
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE PART 2: RAPID ASSESSMENT 
 
Part 2 of the Phase 2 questionnaire asks respondents additional questions about institutions 
at local level not (adequately) covered in Phase 1. 
 
 
PLANNING PROCESSES AND INFORMATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
2-1 Have you heard about the O & OD planning methodology?   
 
 
2-2 Is the O & OD planning methodology effective in representing villagers’ 
development priorities? 
 
 
2-3 What are your most important sources of information about development 
in your area?  
 
 
 
 
DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
2-4 How influential are political parties are in this village/mtaa? 
 
 
2-5 How knowledgeable are you about the election process, including 
registration and voting? 
 
 
2-6 Do you think election processes at the ward level were free and fair? 
 
 
2-7 Do you think election processes at the national level were free and fair? 
 
 
2-8 Do you have confidence in political leaders at the ward level? 
 
 
2-9 Do you have confidence in political leaders at national level? 
 
 
2-10 Are opposing views on issues accepted by the leadership at local level? 
 
 
2-11 Are opposing views on issues accepted at national level? 
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ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
2-12 Are there private entrepreneurs in your village/mtaa? 
 
 
2-13 If yes, how do you judge their influence in decision-making regarding 
local development projects? 
 
 
2-14 If yes, how do you judge their influence in decision-making regarding 
local politics? 
 
 
 
 
ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
2-15 Are there any NGOs and/or community based organizations active in 
this village/mtaa? 
 
 
2-16 If yes, which ones are they? 
 
 
2-17 Are NGOs and/or community based organizations successful in 
promoting participation for development in your village? 
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Appendix 5: Illustration of Local Level Decision-making Structures 
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